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Takings, Fairness, and Farmland Preservation
MARK W. CORDES*
Farmland preservation has become a growing societal concern in recent
years, most clearly seen in the variety of state and local efforts to address
conversion problems. Although each of these programs has a legitimate role to
play in preservingfarmland, the need to restrict landowners ability to sell makes
agricultural zoning a necessary and central component ofpreservation efforts.
Agricultural zoning is controversial, however, because of the significant
financial impact it often imposes on landowners under the greatest conversion
pressure. In particular, it is commonly subject to two related concerns: that the
substantial diminution in value constitutes an unconstitutional taking and, even if
constitutional, that the substantial economic burdens are unfair.
Professor Cordes examines each of these concerns and demonstrates that
agricultural zoning should not normally constitute a taking or be viewed as
inherently unfair, despite substantial economic impacts on landowners. Most
agricultural zoning should not be a taking under Supreme Court takings
jurisprudence, which focuses on whether property remains economically viable.
This has been borne out by lower court decisions that have consistently rejected
takings challenges to agricultural zoning. Similarly, agricultural zoning is not
inherently unfair even when resulting in substantial economic loss. Such losses
must be evaluated in a broader regulatory framework in which much of the
property values were created by government 'ivings" and in which landowners
benefit from other regulatory schemes. Moreover, our legal system has long
recognized that property ownership is subject to the broader public interest, and
reasonable landowner expectations must incorporate the possibility of
regulation tofurther such interests.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is converting farmland at substantial rates.1 Although
several factors account for this conversion, the basic reason for most farmland
conversion is simple economics: as the suburbs expand, farmland will often bring
a higher price in alternative, more intensive land uses, such as residential or
commercial. Whatever its broader worth to society as farmland, to the immediate
parties involved the land is more valuable converted. This has often included
some of America's best and most productive farmland.2
Whether farmland conversion presents a societal problem is subject to some
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. The author would like to
thank Kristen Drake and Melissa Irick for their research assistance in the preparation of this
article.
I See generally A. ANN SORENSEN ET AL., AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, FARMING ON
THE EDGE (1997) (discussing the report of the American Farmland Trust that documented
substantial conversion of America's best farmland); infra text accompanying notes 14-43.
2 SORENSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 2-3, 8-20.
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debate.3 Nonetheless, all levels of government have perceived farmland
conversion as a problem and have responded with a variety of programs to slow
and control the iate of conversion4 Some of these might be viewed as voluntary
incentives to encourage farmers not to convert farmland, such as special tax
incentive programs or recognition of agricultural districts. These provide financial
incentives for farmers to help alleviate conversion pressure. Similarly, right-to-
farm laws protect farming activities against nuisance actions based on
encroaching development.
Although each of the above are important components of farmland
preservation efforts, commentators have noted they are often ineffective in
stopping conversion. 5 As a practical matter such voluntary incentives are rarely
enough to stop conversion in the long run, since they only partially offset the
3 Several major reports in recent years have documented the loss of farmland and
concluded that it presents a major problem. See id. at 2-3, 8-20; see generally U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC. & PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON ENVrL. QuALrIY, NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS
STUDY, FINAL REPORT (1981), [hereinafter NALS]. This perception is joined by a substantial
amount of both academic and popular commentary. See generally, e.g., TOM DANILs &
DEBORAH BOWERS, HOLDING OUR GROUND: PROTECING AMERICA'S FARMS AND FARMLANDS
(1997); Lawrence W. Libby, Farmland Protection for Illinois: The Planning and Legal Issues
17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 425 (1997); Luther Tweeten, Food Security and Farmland Preservation,
3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 237 (1998). A number of commentators, however, have questioned
whether farmland conversion is in fact a problem, or is at least to the degree often stated by
proponents of preservation. See generally, e.g., Orlando E. Delogu, A Comprehensive State and
Local Government Land Use Control Strategy to Preserve the Nation's Farmland is
Unnecessary and Unwise, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 519 (1986); William A. Fischel, The
Urbanization of Urban Land: A Review of the National Agricultural Lands Study, 58 LAND
ECON. 236 (1982); Ralph E. Heimlich & Kenneth S. Krupa, Changes in Land Quality
Accompanying Urbanization in U.S. Fast-Growth Counties, 49 J. OF SOIL & WATER
CONSERvATION 367, 373-74 (1994); Urban Land Inst., Has the Farmland Crisis Been
Overstated? Recommendations for Balancing Urban and Agricultural Land Needs, in 1983
ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 235 (Fredric Strom ed., 1983).
4 he federal govemment has initiated several actions directed toward farmland
preservation, including passage of the Farmland Protection Policy Act in 1981, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 4201 to 4209 (1994), and passage of the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act
of 1996 (FAIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat. 888 (codified as amended in scattered
provisions of Title 7 of the United States Code). All 50 states have enacted a variety of
measures designed to preserve farmland, including tax incentive provisions, right-to-farm laws,
agricultural districting, and special Purchase of Development Rights (PDR) programs. See ifra
Part I.C. Local govemments also extensively regulate farmland, usually through zoning
provisions. See, ag., NALS, supra note 3, at 63-75 (discussing varieties of local government
efforts to preserve farmland).
5 See SARAH E. REDFIELD, VANISHING FARMLAND: A LEGAL SOLUTION FOR THE STATES
96-97 (1984); William L. Church, Farmland Conversion: The View from 1986, 1986 U. ILL. L.
REV. 521, 550; James B. Wadley, Small Farms: The USDA, Rural Communities and Urban
Pressures, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 478,493 (1981-1982).
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financial benefits of conversion.6 At best they only delay conversion, at times
subsidizing farmland while it is in a holding pattern. In particular, by letting
property owners themselves retain the ultimate decision on whether to convert;
such voluntary programs will almost always be ineffective.
Therefore, local governments have increasingly looked to preservation
methods that restrict a landowner's ability to convert. In a limited number of
instances, local governments have pursued Purchase of Development Rights
(PDR) or Transferrable Development Rights (TDR) programs, 7 which at least
partially shift the cost of preservation back to the government by providing
compensation to the property owner. More commonly, however, government has
achieved this through some form of conventional zoning.8 This in effect restricts
any development rights on the part of the property owner without paying
compensation.
Although financially prudent for local government, agricultural zoning and
other public restrictions on farmland can at times result in substantial diminution
in value to landowners. This is particularly Irue with farmland under the greatest
conversion pressure on the urban fringe, where market values might be several
times greater if the property can be developed.9 As a result, two closely related
concerns have often been raised by property owners. First, property owners have
often challenged such zoning as an unconstitutional taking, especially where
substantial diminution in value results. 10 Second, beyond any takings challenge,
property rights proponents have argued that restrictions which preclude any
development on undeveloped land, including farmland, are unfair where
landowners suffer substantial loss in value.11 In particular, property rights
6 See Church, supra note 5, at 550.
7 See Jeanne S. White, Beating Plowshares into Townhomes: The Loss of Farmland and
Strategies for Slowing its Conversion to Nonagricultural Uses, 28 ENVTL. L: 113, 135-43
(1998) (discussing successful TDR and conservation easement programs to preserve farmland).
8 See generally Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Farmland Preservation: A Vital
Agricultural Law Issuefor the 1980s, 21 WASHBuRN L.J. 443, 451 (1981-82).
9 See, e.g., Harvard State Bank v. County of McHenry, 620 N.E.2d 1360, 1363 (Il1. App.
Ct. 1993) (holding that property value doubled if rezoned for development); Wilson v. County
of McHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426, 429 (111. App. Ct. 1981) (describing fivefold increase if
agricultural land rezoned for development); Van Arsdel v. Township of Addison, 195 N.W.2d
21, 23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (describing at least threefold increase if agricultural land rezoned
for development).
10 See infra Part I. B. (discussing state-court review of "takings" challenges to agricultural
zoning).
11 See Private Property Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 161 Before the House Agric.
Subcomm. on Dep't Operations and Nutrition, 102d Cong. 97-102 (1993) (testimony of Ben
Love on behalf of Nat'l Cattlemen's Assoc.); Stephen C. Fehr, Montgomery's Line of Defense
Against the Suburban Invasion, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1997, at Al (describing fairness
concerns raised by farmers in efforts to preserve farmland in Montgomery County, Maryland);
David Helvarg, Legal Assault on the Environment: 'Property Rights' Movement, NATION, Jan.
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proponents have suggested that agricultural zoning is unfair because it forces a
few landowners to bear the cost of preserving farmland for the benefit of many.
This latter fairness argument is an important one for environmental regulation
in general, and farmland preservation in particular.12 Even assuming
constitutionality, fairness is an important component in setting policy and affects
the political acceptability of alternative outcomes. Moreover, fairness arguments
have been at the heart of recent efforts to legislatively expand compensable
takings, with farmland issues being an important dimension of that effort.13
This Article will examine the validity of agricultural zoning as a technique to
preserve farmland, and in particular the extent to which it raises takings and
fairness concerns. Its basic premise is that agricultural zoning does not, in most
instances, constitute a taking. Moreover, public restrictions on farmland are not
inherently unfair, even when they result in a substantial diminution in value.
When feasible, alternative techniques such as PDR and TDR programs, which
provide at least some offsetting compensation, are appropriate to mitigate the
economic impact of zoning and might better balance the respective private and
public interests involved. When implemented, these alternative approaches might
also be more effective at preserving farmland, since they can more effectively
withstand political change and pressure. Yet PDR and TDR programs face
significant practical constraints which limit their overall effectiveness as farmland
preservation techniques, and in their absence traditional zoning should not be
viewed as inherently unfair.
Part II briefly discusses some background issues, including a brief discussion
of farmland conversion, some of the arguments for preservation, and a
rudimentary overview of preservation techniques. Part III considers whether
agricultural zoning might constitute a taking, examining both current Supreme
Court analysis and lower court treatment of takings challenges to agricultural
zoning. It indicates that under both current Supreme Court takings jurisprudence,
as well as lower court treatment of the issue, agricultural zoning will rarely
30, 1995, at 126, 128 (noting that many political observers see the Farm Bureau as a major
force behind takings legislation initiatives).
12 For an excellent discussion of the need to address fairness concerns in environmental
law, including those surrounding property rights, see generally Richard J. Lazarus, Fairness in
EnvironmentalLaw, 27 ENVTL. L. 705 (1997).
13 The last decade has seen a significant "property fights" movement in this country
designed to expand the scope of compensable takings. This has involved not only court actions,
but significant legislative efforts at both the state and federal level to expand takings. Most
commonly, this has involved "assessment' statutes which require government officials to assess
whether their actions constitute a taking under current judicial standards. A number of states
have also considered compensation statutes which would require compensation when
government regulation reduces the value of land by a certain percentage, such as 50%. To date
such compensation statutes have been passed in only four states. See Mark W. Cordes,
Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187,
212-20 (1997).
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constitute an unconstitutional taking. Finally, Part IV addresses the issue of
fairness in farmland preservation, suggesting three reasons why agricultural
zoning should not be viewed as inherently unfair even when substantial
diminution in value results. These are the concept of government "givings" that
enhance land values in the first instance; recognition of general regulatory
reciprocity which mitigates fairness concerns; and the nature of property rights,
which has long viewed private interests as being subject to broader public needs.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Problem of Conversion
As was mentioned above, the United States is converting farmland at
considerable rates. Although occasional warnings were given about the problem
in the 1960s and 1970s, the problem gained national attention by the now well-
known National Agricultural Lands Study (NALS) in 1981, conducted by the
United States Department of Agriculture and the President's Council on
Environmental Quality.14 The study conducted a comprehensive inventory of the
nation's agricultural land base as of 1977, looking at conversion patterns, varying
quality of farmland, existing agricultural reserves, projected conversion rates, and
the future need for farmland. The study estimated that the nation's non-federally
owned agricultural land base at that time was 1.36 billion acres, which included
413 million acres of cropland, with the remaining land divided primarily between
rangeland, pastureland, and forestland.15 For purposes of the study, the most
important category was the "cropland base," which included the then current 413
million acres of cropland as well as an additional 127 million acres of "potential
cropland," comprised of land with high or medium cropland potential from the
other categories of land.16 Thus, the study viewed the nation's cropland base as
consisting of 540 million total acres.
The study further examined changes within the agricultural land base, such as
shifting of cropland in and out of other agricultural categories. 17 Central to its
14 NALS, supra note 3.
15 The agricultural land base consisted of 413 million acres of cropland, 414 million acres
of rangeland, 376 million acres of forestland, 133 million acres of pastureland, and 23 million
acres of other farmland. See id. at 28-29.
16 Id. at 28-30.
17 For the years 1967-75 the study noted a relatively large amount of land that shifted
between different uses within the agricultural land base, including shifting in and out of
cropland use. This "indicate[d] considerable flexibility in how American farmers, ranchers and
foresters use the nation's agricultural land base." Id at 32. It also noted, however, that often
"shifts of land from cropland uses are not considered readily reversible," with only one-third of
the land shifted from cropland use during 1967-75 still having high or medium potential as
future cropland. Id
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study, however, was its finding that three million acres were annually being
converted from the agricultural land base to nonagricultural uses-one million
acres of which were from the cropland base.18 More than two-thirds of the land
converted to nonagricultural use was attributable to urban build-up and
transportation uses, with approximately an additional thirty percent being
displaced by "reservoirs, lakes, and other water-impounding facilities." 19 The
study attributed most of this conversion to changing living patterns, noting the
substantial spreading of residential development into rural America. It noted that
the "highest rates of population growth occurred in the open countlry and in
unincorporated areas," and were often accompanied by scattered development on
large lots.2°
Although the rate of farmland conversion did not present an immediate threat
to the nation's welfare,21 the study sounded a substantial alarm about the long-
term consequences that would occur if current conversion rates remained
unchecked. In particular, it noted that the United States would increasingly be
involved with international food markets, which had become an important part of
our economic base.22 Thus, even if current inventories were adequate to meet our
own food needs in the foreseeable future, viewed from a more global perspective
the rate of farmland conversion was "cause for serious concern." 23 The study did
not recommend a complete stop of conversion, which would have been
unrealistic, but did recommend that the nation undertake a number of immediate
steps to begin to slow the conversion rate and steer its direction. Although many
of the specific recommendations were directed at the federal level,24 the study
recognized that the problem was largely local in nature and encouraged state and
local governments to undertake various efforts to control conversion.25
The NALS had a substantial impact, giving impetus to passage of the federal
Farmland Protection Policy Act in 1981,26 and reinforcing the already growing
concern at the state and local level for the need to protect farmland. Despite its
influence, the NALS has been subject to significant criticism.2 7 Several responses
18 See id. at 8, 35-37.19 Id. at35.
2 0 Id. at 10.
21 See id at 17.
22 See id at 84.
2 3 Id. at 85.
24 See id at 88-97 (discussing recommendations aimed at the federal andnational level).
25 See id at 86 ("These recommendations emphasize the primary roles of states and local
governments in conserving agricultural land and the supporting roles which can be played by
agencies at the federal level.").
26 Farmland Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 4201 to 4209 (1994). For commentary on the
Act, see generally Corwin W. Johnson & Valerie M. Fogelman, The Farmland Protection
Policy Act: Stillbirth ofa Policy?, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 563.
27 See LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE § 6.03 (1998)
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challenged its farmland conversion figures as "either exaggerated or ultimately
unimportant,"28 arguing that less conversion was taking place than reported and
that more potential cropland existed than reported. Similarly, critics questioned
the NALS's projections about future demand as being exaggerated, and further
faulted the study for not considering future increases in crop yield.29 Even some
sympathetic to farmland preservation noted the tenuous basis of some of the
study's projections.30 Indeed, the years since the NALS have shown that some of
its projections were overdrawn, especially concerning the state of the agricultural
land base as we approach the year 2000. Rather than having reached the limits of
all current and reserve cropland, we currently retain sufficient levels of cropland
for the immediate future.
Nevertheless, many of the concerns raised by the NALS study remain real
today. Indeed, a recent and comprehensive study by the American Farmland Trust
(AFT) confirmed the continuing loss of farmland and its potential consequences.
Entitled "Farming on the Edge,"31 the study primarily focused on the "geographic
relationship between high quality farmland and development pressure."32 To do
this, the AFT examined conversion patterns for the years 1982-1992, using a
"Geographic Information System" database largely based on the Department of
Agriculture's National Resources Inventory. The study further analyzed
conversion patterns and development pressures within each of the nation's 181
Major Land Resource Areas (MLRAs), geographic regions defined by the USDA
as having homogenous characteristics relevant to farming.33
Not surprisingly, the AFT study found that every state lost some of its best
farmland to urban development during that period.34 This included four million
acres of "prime" farmland that were converted to more intensive land uses. 35
More importantly, however, the study showed that a substantial amount of the
country's best farmland was under significant development pressure. Seventy
percent of the nation's MLRAs had high quality farmland in proximity to
(summarizing critiques of NALS, especially that of William Fischel, and responses to the
critiques); see, generally, JOHN BADEN, THE VANIsMNG FARMLAND CRISIS: CRrrICAL VIEWS
OF THE MOVEMENT TO PRESERVE AGRICULTURAL LAND (1984) (containing nine essays critical
of the NALS study); Fischel, supra note 3.
2 8 Urban Land Institute, supra note 3, at 240 (reviewing various criticisms of the NALS
study and challenges to the data).
2 9 See id. at 244-48; Delogu, supra note 3, at 530-33.
30 See Church, supra note 5, at 538-40.
31 SORENSEN Er AL., supra note 1.
32 Id. at4.
33 Id. at 4-7. These characteristics include "homogeneous patterns of soil, climate, water
resources, land use and type of farming." Id. at 6. MLRAs are typically comprised of several
million acres. See id. at 7.
34 See id at5.
35 See id at 18.
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significant development pressure.36 The mapping system showed a significant
portion of the nation's high quality farmland as "threatened," which it defined as
"concentrations of prime and/or unique farmland coinciding with the state's most
rapidly developing area(s). '37 This in part reflects that much of the nation's best
farmland is near metropolitan areas, but the study also noted that migration back
into more rural communities is having a significant impact.38
As did the earlier NALS study, the AFT's study raises concerns about the
long-term consequences of conversion. Under what it labeled its "worst case
scenario," which it acknowledged might never materialize, the United States
would become a net importer of food within sixty years.39 Of more immediate
concern was the loss of the current environmental benefits of farmland, such as
"open space, wildlife habitat [and] groundwater recharge." 40 It also noted that
loss of prime farmland is often replaced with less suitable land, resulting in
environmental damage by clearing forests or draining wetlands, and increased
erosion rates. 41 Although the study recognized that development is necessary, the
significant and irreversible loss of the benefits of prime farmland made it
important that development be directed toward land less suited for high quality
agricultural use.42 The study concluded with an extensive set of recommendations
directed at generating additional research and information, strengthening federal
preservation efforts, and promoting state and local programs to preserve farmland,
especially in those states having land in the top twenty threatened MLRAs. 43
36 See id at 2, 5-8. For purposes of the study, the AFT included within the category of
"high quality farmland" both the USDA's category of "prime" farmland and AFT's own
definition of "unique" farmland. The USDA's "prime" farmland designation is "defined as land
most suitable for producing food, feed, forage, fiber and oilseed crops." Id at 5. To be classified
as "prime," land must meet a number of specified criteria, including adequate moisture supply,
acceptable acidity, acceptable salt/sodium content, limited flooding, acceptable water tables,
and acceptable slope ranges. See id at Glossary (citing USDA-SCS, 1982 NRI). The AFT's
"unique" farmland designation was farmland other than "prime" farmland that was "used for
the production of specific high-value food and fiber crops[,]" such as vegetables, grapes, fruits,
nuts, and berries and which therefore had "unique soil and climatic requirements." Id
3 7 Id. at4.
38 Seeid at5.
39 See id at 2. The study in fact based this "worst case scenario" of being a net importer of
food within sixty years on conclusions offered at a press conference by the American
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the nation's leading scientific
association, at its 1996 annual meeting. See SORENSEN Er AL., supra note 1, at 24 n.1 (citing
PRESS CONFERENCE: New Views on Consumption, Population and the Environment, AMERICAN
Assoc. FORTIIE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, ANNUALMEEmING, Feb. 9,1996).
4 0
'SORENSEN F'T AL., supra note 1, at 20.
41 See id. at 19.
42 See id at 18.
43 See id at 21-23. The top twenty MLRAs, from highest to lowest scores, are:
Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys; Northem Piedmont (primarily parts of Maryland, New
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B. Rationales for Preservation
Although a variety of reasons have been given for wanting to preserve
farmland from current conversion rates, they generally can be placed in two
groups: "food security" concerns and environmental benefits.44 "Food security"45
is the idea that farmland conversion threatens our long-term ability to produce
sufficient amounts of food to either feed ourselves or respond to future global
needs. This was first identified as a significant concern in the NALS study, which
raised significant issues regarding the long-term ability of the United States to
produce food.46 It has subsequently found its way into various efforts to preserve
farmland, including being articulated as a major rationale in enacting the federal
Farmland Protection Policy Act of 198147 and some state farmland protection
legislation. 48
The food security issue has been the focus of intense debate during the last
two decades. While several recent analyses have noted it as a continuing
concern,4 9 other commentators have suggested that there is little risk that our
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia); Southern Wisconsin and Northern Illinois Drift Plain;
Texas Blackland Prairie (eastern Texas); Willamette and Puget Sound Valleys (western Oregon
and Washington); Florida Everglades; Eastern Ohio Till Plain; Lower Rio Grande Plain; Mid-
Atlantic Coastal Plain (primarily parts of Delaware and Maryland); New England and Eastern
New York Upland, Southern Part; Ontario Plain and Finger Lakes (western New York);
Nashville Basin (Tennessee); Central Snake River Plains (parts of Idaho); Southwestern
Michigan Fruit and Truck Belt; Central California Coastal Valleys; Columbia Basin (primarily
parts of Washington); Imperial Valley (southern California); Long Island-Cape Cod Coastal
Lowland; Connecticut Valley (primarily parts of Connecticut and Massachusetts); Western
Michigan Fruit and Truck Belt. See id at 8-17.
44 See Libby, supra note 3, at 426-29 (characterizing the two basic types of rationales for
farmland preservation as "food security" and "non-owner services of farmland").
451 borrow the term "food security" from Professor Libby. See id at 426. Others have also
used it. See, e.g., Tweeten, supra note 3, at 247.
4 6 See NALS, supra note 3, at 56-62. The NALS noted numerous uncertainties in
projecting the ability to meet food demands in the future, including improving crop yields
through possible technological innovations and improved management practices, affecting both
future domestic and international needs.
4 7 See Farmland Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §4201(a) (1994) (stating that farmland
conversion "may threaten the ability of the United States to produce food and fiber in sufficient
quantities to meet domestic needs and the demands of our export markets").
48 See Illinois Farmland Preservation Act, 505 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/2 (West 1993 &
Supp. 1999) (stating that farmland conversion "reduces future food production capability and
may ultimately undermine agriculture as a major economic activity in Illinois"). A number of
states have also passed Executive Orders aimed at preserving farmland, typically citing food
security concerns as one rationale for the order. See, e.g., Ga. Exec. Order No. 01917 (1981);
Mich. Exec. Directive No. 1986-2 (1986).
49 See generally David Pimentel et. al., Environmental and Economic Costs of Soil
Erosion and Conservation Benefits, 267 SCIENCE 1117 (1995) (analyzing world-wide rates of
soil erosion and stating that it poses a major threat to the ability of the world to feed itself in the
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country will be unable to feed itself no matter how much conversion takes
place.50 The food security argument can be quite nuanced, however, and take
various forms.51 As noted by Professor Frank Church, "even if the country did
begin to reach its full cropland capacity, the consequences would not be
immediate starvation but only a gradual increase in the price of food relative to
other prices."52 He also notes that we have a cushion if a food security problem
begins to arise, including simplifying our diets, spending a higher percentage of
our wealth on food, and cutting back on exports. He concludes that "[a]lthough a
serious problem may never materialize, the possibility of a problem justifies at
least some concem. ' 5 3 Thus, although our domestic food supply might not be
realistically threatened, we might be at risk of not being as competitive in
international markets or as responsive as we might be to a food crisis elsewhere.5 4
Though food will remain available, it will cost more and thus impose other costs
future); Luther Tweeten, Food Security and Farmland Preservation, 3 DRAKE .AGRIC. L. 237
(1998); David Pimentel & Marci Pimentel, U.S. Food Production Threatened by Rapid
Population Growth, (last modified Oct. 30, 1997) <httpJ/vww.enviroweb.org/gaia-
pc/Pimentel2.html>.
50 See Peter Gordon & Harry W. Richardson, Farmland Preservation and Ecological
Footprints: A Critique (visited Aug. 21, 1999) <http'/www-pam.usc.edu/vlila2sl.html>
(discussing theory of two University of Southern California economists who challenge
assumptions behind food security concerns and question the need to preserve farmland).
51 For an excellent and in-depth analysis of the food security issue as of a decade ago, see
generally Church, supra note 5. Professor Church notes that as of the mid-1980s "the domestic
and worldwide supply of food considerably exceed[ed] the demand," with Americans still
having millions of acres of potential cropland in reserve. Whether a future food problem would
exist depends both on "future supply and demand of food here and abroad and on the future
supply of American farmland to produce that food." Id at 522. He then proceeds to analyze the
various factors in-depth, examining national and world population trends, changing nutritional
standards, projected world food production, anticipated export demands for United States food,
and possible farmland conversion scenarios in the United States. See id at 522-41. After an in-
depth analysis of these factors, Church states that "[t]he untidy truth is simply that no one can
be sure whether a farmland preservation problem will arise or not?' Id at 541.
52Id. at 542.
53 Id. at 543.
54 See Tweeten, supra note 3, at 240-50. Professor Tweeten's article analyzes a number of
factors that impact food security projections for the future, including the magnitude and sources
of farmland losses, historic global yield trends for five major crops, and future demand for food
based on population and global income projections. From a rather sophisticated analysis he
concludes that "the future global food supply and demand balance" will be tighter than what we
have experienced since World War II. Id. at 247. He notes, however, that this will primarily
threaten poor nations, and does not suggest food shortages in the United States. He indicates
that food prices will rise in this country, but since food prices are only a small portion of our
income in this country, it will not have a major impact on most people, though possibly some
effect on low-income people. See id. at 247-48. It will potentially have a major effect globally,
however, and Professor Tweeten suggests the need for national and international responses at
this time. See id at 248-49.
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on future generations. Moreover, our ability to respond in a humanitarian fashion
to food crises elsewhere might be compromised, bringing a moral dimension to
the debate.55
Needless to say, the food security issue is neither clearcut nor singularly
compelling at this point. Although the long-range future is always hard to predict,
any food security concerns are very uncertain at best.56 Nonetheless, there are
certainly some attenuated long-term food issues for farmland preservation, and it
continues to be a stated rationale for regulatory efforts.57 Moreover, the
irreversible nature of farmland conversion, together with potential time lags for
appropriate market responses, suggest it is prudent to err on the side of caution in
this area.58
The second general type of rationale behind farmland preservation concerns a
variety of what might loosely be termed as "environmental benefits" from
farmland preservation. As noted by the AFT study and various commentators,
farmland provides a number of benefits for society, including groundwater
recharge, control of stormwater runoff, wildlife habitat, and open-space
preservation.59 Moreover, preservation of prime farmland avoids environmental
costs often associated with shifting rangeland and forestland to the cropland base.
This might include increased erosion rates, loss of forests, and increased water
usage.60
Particularly important to some are the aesthetic and open space benefits
provided by farmland preservation. The open space provided by farmland near
55 'Me NALS study suggested this as one additional concern in evaluating our ability to
respond to future international food needs, noting in particular that future increases in food
production costs might make solutions to international food shortages more difficult. See
NALS, supra note 3, at 61-62; see also MALONE, supra note 27, § 6.03 (noting the argument
that farmland preservation is necessary to maintain adequate worldwide food supplies in
future).
5 6 See, e.g., Church, supra note 5, at 541-43.
5 7 See, e.g., Farmland Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 4201(a) (1994); Illinois Farmland
Preservation Act, 505 Ill. Comp. Stat. 75/2 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
5 8 Larry Libby makes this point well, noting that the "food security" issue is really about
"risk management over time." Libby, supra note 3, at 427. He recognizes there is substantial
uncertainty regarding our future ability to meet food needs, but that most current projections are
"sanguine" about our food production capacity until about 2050. See id He notes that this is
based on several assumptions, including retention of some of the "most highly productive land
in farms[,]" continued management and technological advances, and the ability to convert other
lands (such as pasture and range) to productive farmland. Id. However, from a risk management
perspective, he concludes that the consequences of preserving more farmland than needed are
less severe than the consequences of not preserving enough. See id. at 427-28; see also Church,
supra note 5, at 543 ("[a]lthough a serious problem may never materialize, the possibility of a
problem justifies at least some present concern'.
59 See SORENSEN Er AL., supra note 1, at 19-20; see also Libby, supra note 3, at 429;
Tweeten, supra note 3, at 237-38.
60 SeeSORENSENEAL., supra note 1, at 19.
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residential development provides aesthetic relief from the intense development
that surrounds residents, and often serves as a buffer between development and
other sensitive land uses.61 Preservation of farmland in proximity to development
can also be an important reminder of our nation's heritage.
Finally, farmland preservation can also be seen as an important growth
control measure helping to counter the effects of suburban sprawl. By preserving
high quality farmland near the urban fringe, it necessarily limits the more
scattered type of development that characterizes suburban sprawl. Not only does
such sprawl threaten prime farmland, but it also imposes substantial infrastructure
costs. 62 Scatter development also creates lengthier response time in terms of fire
and police protection, and greater financial costs to serve such areas.63 Thus, a
benefit of farmland preservation is to facilitate growth management and decrease
various societal costs associated with scatter development.
Proponents of farmland preservation do not suggest that the above rationales
justify stopping all conversion. Most recognize that some conversion is inevitable
and necessary to address other societal needs, most notably housing.64 Ideally,
conversion would occur when farmland is better suited for alternative uses, and
would not occur when the benefits of preservation outweigh those of conversion.
The concern, however, is that our best farmland is being converted at too fast a
rate and broader societal concerns are not being adequately considered.
It might be argued, of course, that the market itself is the best avenue to
allocate land uses and that the current conversion rate simply reflects societal
preferences for land in its alternative, nonagricultural use.65 The problem is that
the market fails to consider all the costs and benefits in the transaction-they are
external to the decisionmaking process. Thus, even if society is clearly better off
in some instances by preserving farmland rather than converting it to alternative,
nonagricultural uses, most of the benefits from preservation go to the broader
public and not to the immediate parties involved. From the perspective of the
61 See id. at 20; Sean F. Nolon & Cozata Solloway, Comment, Preserving Our Heritage:
Tools to Cultivate Agricultural Preservation in New York State, 17 PACE L. REV. 591, 594-95
(1997).
62 See SORENSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 20.
63 A recent study prepared for the Center for Agriculture in the Environment, a branch of
the American Farmland Trust, found that large lot, scatter development-the type most
frequently threatening to prime farmland-imposed increased financial costs for infrastructure
and also caused significant response time for police and fire protection. See I Dixon Esseks, et
al., Fiscal Costs and Public Safety Risks of Low-Density Residential Development on
Farmland: Findings from Three Diverse Locations on the Urban Fringe of the Chicago
Metropolitan Area (ast modified Jan. 1999) <http://farm.fic.niu.edu/cae/wp/98-1/wp98-
I .html>.
64 See, e.g., Church, supra note 5, at 553.
65 Similarly, the argument has been made that even if a farmland conversion problem
arises, the market, through its pricing mechanisms, will itself move to protect farmland without
the need for government intervention. See Delogu, supra note 3, at 523-33.
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landowner considering an attractive offer to sell, the immediate benefits from
conversion are almost always greater. It is this concern that legitimizes
government intervention to control conversion, at least in some instances. The
next section of this Article briefly overviews some of the basic farmland
preservation techniques that have been used.
C. Farmland Preservation Techniques
In response to the growing perception that farmland conversion is a
significant societal problem, and given additional impetus by the 1981 NALS
study, state and local governments have adopted a variety of techniques to
encourage the preservation of farmland. The NALS study identified several basic
types of programs which continue to form the basis for local and state
preservation efforts today.66 This Article does not give a comprehensive
discussion of these programs, which has been done elsewhere,67 but instead
briefly summarizes the most common alternatives.
One of the earliest and most common techniques for farmland preservation is
state programs providing various types of tax-relief to owners of agricultural
land.68 Today all fifty states have some form of tax relief provisions for
agricultural land.69 The most common of these are preferential-assessment
statutes, which assess land at a reduced value when used for agriculture 70 and
deferred taxation programs,71 which provide lower assessment for farmland but
66 See NALS, supra note 3, at 63-75.
67 See generally, e.g., Church, supra note 5; Robert E. Coughlin & John C. Keene, The
Protection of Farmland: An Analysis of Various State and Local Approaches, 33 LAND USE L.
& ZONING DIGEST, 5 (1981); Juergensmeyer, supra note 8; Teri E. Pope, A Survey of
Governmental Response to the Farmland Crisis: States'Application ofAgricultural Zoning, 11
U. ARK. LrrLE ROCK LJ. 515 (1988-1989); Jerome G. Rose, Farmland Preservation Policy
and Programs, 24 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 591 (1984). For a recent examination of how several
different strategies have been applied in concrete situations, see White, supra note 7.
6 8 For a general discussion of differential tax programs for farmland, see generally Barry
A. Currier, An Analysis of Differential Taxation as a Method of Maintaining Agricultural and
Open Space Land Uses, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 821 (1978); Juergensmeyer, supra note 8, at 466-
70.
69 See American Farmland Trust, State Farmland Protection Statutes by Category (Table)
(visited Oct. 30, 1999) <http'//fanm.fic.niu.edu/fic/lawsfpkeytab.html> (categorizing all 50
state statutes).
70 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-12004, 42-15004 (West 1999); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 39-1-102 to 103 (1998); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-5-7 to 7.5 (1999); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 441.21 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.111 (West 1999); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 57-02-27 to 27.2 (1983 & Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE § 11-IA-10 (1995 &
Supp. 1999).
71 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 40-7-25 to 25.3 (1993 & Supp. 1998); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 200/10-110 to 147 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. §§77-1343 to
1363(1996 & Supp. 1998); N.J STAT. ANN. §§ 54:4-23.1 to 23.21 (West 1986 & Supp. 1999);
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require partial or total repayment of tax savings if the land is later converted to
other uses. The obvious purpose of both types of legislation is to provide financial
incentives for farmers to offset the financial pressures posed by conversion.
A second type of farmland preservation program, also found in all fifty states,
are right-to-farm laws.72 These statutes provide farmers protection against certain
nuisance actions, typically in "coming to the nuisance" situations, where
development has moved out to agricultural areas and created conflicting uses.73
Slightly less than half the states also provide protection against local government
efforts to zone out existing agricultural uses, again typically in "coming to the
nuisance" scenarios.74 They do not permit expansion of existing uses, but provide
protection for the level of agricultural activity in existence when development
arrived. These right-to-farm statutes do not guarantee preservation, but provide
protection to farmers who desire to continue farming in the face of approaching
development.
A third and less common type of preservation program is agricultural
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5713.34 (Anderson 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-43-220 to 232
(Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp. 1998).
72 For a general discussion of right-to-farm laws, see generally Keith Burgess-Jackson,
The Ethics and Economics of Right-To-Farm Statutes, 9 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 481 (1986);
Jacqueline P. Hand, Right-To-Farm Laws: Breaking New Ground in the Preservation of
Farmland, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 289 (1984); Edward Thompson, Jr., Right-To-Farm Laws, in
1983 ZONING AND PL. L. HANDBOOK 207 (Fredric A. Strom, ed.). For recent criticisms of right-
to-farm laws, see generally Neil D. Hamilton, Right-to-farm Laws Reconsidered: Ten Reasons
Why Legislative Efforts to Resolve Agricultural Nuisances May Be Ineffective, 3 DRAKE J. OF
AGRIC. L. 103 (1998); Alexander A. Reinert, Note, The Right-To-Farm: Hog-Tied and
Nuisance Bound, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1694 (1998).
73 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-127 (1993 & Supp. 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-111
to 112 (West 1995 & Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7 (1997 & Supp. 1999); 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 to 5 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-52-4 (West
1983 & Supp. 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.295 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999); W. VA. CODE
§§ 19-19-1 to 5 (1997 & Supp. 1999). Judicial interpretation of right-to-farm laws has been
limited, although in a few cases courts have found them to be applicable and to bar nuisance
actions. See generally Laux v. Chopin Land Associates, 550 N.E.2d 100 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)
(discussing what constitutes "changed conditions" for nuisance actions); Steffens v. Keeler, 503
N.W.2d 675, 677-78 (Mich. CL App. 1993) (per curiam) (barring a nuisance claim because
evidence did not show the change of agricultural area to a residential area). In a recent case,
however, Bormann v. Board of Supervisors for Kossuth County, 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998),
the Iowa Supreme Court held that the nuisance immunity provision found in Iowa's agricultural
land preservation statute constituted a taking of neighbors' property rights and was therefore
unconstitutional. See id. at 321.
74 See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 3482.5 to .6 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); COLO. REV.
STAT.§§ 35-3.5-101 to 103 (1998); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 42-04-01 to 05 (1983 & Supp. 1999);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.13 (Anderson 1997 & Supp. 1998); 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 951- 957 (West 1995 & Supp. 1999); S.C. CODEANN. §§ 46-45-10 to 60 (Law. Co-op. 1987
& Supp. 1998); TEX. AGRIC. CODEANN. §§ 251.001-251.006 (West 1982 & Supp. 1999); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 823.08 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).
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districting.75 Currently recognized in approximately fifteen states, 7 6 agricultural
districting involves the voluntary creation of special agricultural districts, which
require that the land be used for agricultural purposes. Districts are established for
a limited period of time, such as five to ten years, which can then be renewed. In
exchange for the requirement that the land stay agricultural, landowners receive a
number of benefits, depending on the particular authorizing statute. Some are
similar to benefits conferred by other statutes, such as differential tax assessments
and right-to-farm provisions. Others are more unique to the district, and might
include PDR provisions, limitations on the exercise of eminent domain against
farm property, and restrictions on special assessments and government
annexations.77
As noted by various commentators, the voluntary nature of all of the above
programs significantly limit their effectiveness.7 8 Right-to-farm laws are only
effective in preventing involuntary conversion against a landowner's wishes; they
provide little basis to preserve farmland when a farmer desires to convert.
Although tax incentives and agricultural districting can both provide some
temporary relief from conversion pressures, neither is sufficient to offset the
financial incentive of conversion when significant development pressure exists.7 9
Indeed, in some instances they simply help subsidize farmland while waiting for
development Such programs play an important role in a comprehensive
preservation program, but by themselves will often be ineffective in establishing
long-term farmland preservation.
For that reason, effective farmland preservation programs will need to restrict
a landowner's ability to convert by relying on techniques that place
decisionmaking authority elsewhere, most notably the government. The most
common and least expensive way this can be done is by some type of public
restriction placed on the land, typically in the form of agricultural zoning.
Fourteen states currently have statutes which specifically address and authorize
75 For discussions of agricultural districting, see MALONE, supra note 27, at § 6.09;
Coughlin & Keene, supra note 67, at 6-7; White, supra note 7, at 124-135.
76 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3 §§ 901-930 (1993 & Supp. 1998); 505 ILL. COM.
STAT. ANN. 511 to 20.3 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 352.1 to 352.12 (West
1994 & Supp. 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262.850 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1998); MD. CODE
ANN., AGRIC. §§ 2-501 to 516 (1999); MASs. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 132A, § lIA (Law. Co-op.
1989 & Lexis Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 473 H.01-473 H.18 (West 1994 & Supp.
1999); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:1C-1 to 55 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 929.01 to .05 (Anderson 1988 & Supp. 1999); 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 901-915 (West
1995 & Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 43-34-101 to 108 (Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 17-41-101 to 406"(1995 & Supp. 1999).
77 See MALONE, supra note 27, at § 6.09[1]; REDFIELD, supra note 5, at 103.
78 See, e.g., Church, supra note 5, at 547-51; Wadley, supra note 5, at 493.
79 See REDFIELD, supra note 5, at 96-97; Church, supra note 5, at 550-51;
Juergensmeyer, supra note 8, at 466-67.
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particular forms of "agricultural protection zoning, '80 but as a practical matter
agricultural zoning clearly falls within local government's general zoning power,
even in the absence of a special statute. Because it can preclude conversion of
farmland even when significant financial incentives exist zoning is a widely and
increasingly used farmland preservation technique at the local government level.
Agricultural zoning can take several basic forms.81 On the one hand, local
governments can impose what is often referred to as "exclusive agricultural
zoning,"82 which prohibits any use other than agricultural. Even this type of
zoning will permit certain compatible or accessory buildings, such as barns, on
the property; fundamentally, however, exclusive agricultural zoning is designed
to limit the property to agricultural use only.
A more common approach to agricultural zoning is to permit non-farm uses,
most notably residential, but in effect to establish agricultural restrictions through
severe density limitations. This is often done through large minimum-lot size
requirements, where the minimum lot size typically corresponds to "the minimum
size of commercial farms... in the area." 83 Thus, minimum lot sizes might range
from one house per 40 acres to one house per 160 acres. The obvious effect is to
limit the property to agricultural use. Agricultural zoning might also impose
density restrictions but permit small lot "clustering" of actual development on the
property.84 This permits a greater overall density level, such as one" dwelling per
ten acres, but leaves a significant area of land to be completely free for farming.
Whatever its form, agricultural zoning serves the purpose of significantly
limiting development on farmland property, thus preserving the property's
farmland status. Importantly, by placing public restrictions on the property the
landowner is not free to sell the land for nonagricultural use when development
pressure and attendant financial incentives become great. The result is to place the
cost of preservation as reflected in diminution in land value on the restricted
landowner.
In contrast, two other preservation techniques, Purchase of Development
Rights programs and Transferrable Development Rights programs, limit a
landowner's ability to convert, but do so by shifting the cost of preservation to the
80 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-462.01 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998); IND. CODE
ANN. § 36-7-4-601 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100.187 (Michie 1993
& Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 394.25 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 19-903 to 916 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 215.203 (1991 & Supp. 1998); 53 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10601-10608 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 4301-4496 (1992
& Supp. 1998).
81 For discussion of the variations in agricultural zoning, see MALONE, supra note 27,
§ 6.08 (discussing different forms that agricultural zoning can take); Juergensmeyer, supra note
8, at 451-55 (same).
82 See MALONE, supra note 27, § 6.08[3].
83 Id. § 6.08[2][a].
84 See id § 6.08[2][b].
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public. In a PDR program, the government typically will buy the development
rights on farmland, paying the landowner the difference between the property's
value if more intensive development is allowed and its value if limited to
agricultural use.85 The property can no longer be converted to more intense,
nonagricultural use, since the development rights have been transferred
elsewhere, yet the cost of preservation is borne by the public through the purchase
agreement.86
Like PDR programs, TDR programs give restricted property owners
compensation for loss of development rights, but instead of cash landowners are
given development rights that can be transferred elsewhere. 87 The transferred
rights can be used to exceed applicable restrictions in identified "receiving areas,"
thus providing a benefit to the landowner. In effect, the TDRs involve a shifting
of potential development from one area to another, with the result that farmland is
preserved. Moreover, most TDR programs permit the TDRs to be sold to other
landowners with eligible property, providing a source of income to the restricted
property owners. Although TDRs might function in a voluntary setting, they more
typically are provided in conjunction with mandatory zoning schemes to offset
the burden of preservation.88
PDR and TDR programs are attractive in that they shift the cost to the public,
85 For discussions of the use of conservation easements and PDR programs to preserve
farmland, see generally MALONE, supra note 27, at § 6.11; Vivian Quinn, Preserving Farmland
with Conservation Easements: Public Benefit or Burden?, 1992/1993 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 235.
86 A number of states have statutes specifically authorizing PDR programs. See, e.g.,
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-464.01 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998), 11-935.01 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1998); CAL PUB. REV. CODE §§ 10200 to 10277 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-26aa to 26jj (West 1985 & Supp. 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3 §§ 901
to 930 (1993 & Supp. 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 262.900 to 920 (Michie 1994 & Supp.
1998); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 6200-6210 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 432:18 to 432:31a (1991 & Supp. 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:IC-1 to 55 (West 1998
& Supp. 1999); 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 901 to 915 (West 1995 & Supp. 1999); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, §§ 4301 to 4495 (1992 & Supp. 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 8434.010 to
.925 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999); W. VA. CODE §§ 8-24-72 to 78 (1998 & Supp. 1999).
87 The literature on TDRs is voluminous. See generally John J. Costonis, Development
Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE LJ. 75 (1973); Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer,
et al., Transferable Development Rights and Alternatives After Suitum, 30 URB. LAw 441
(1998); Norman Marcus, Air Rights in New York City: TDR, Zoning Lot Merger and the Well-
Considered Plan, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 867 (1984). Several states have passed statutes
specifically authorizing TDR programs. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1633202 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100.208 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 4:1C-1 to 55 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999); N.Y. GEN. CTY LAW § 20-f (McKinney Supp.
1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-7-101 (1992 & Supp. 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 4301-
4496 (1992 & Supp. 1998).
88 See White, supra note 7, at 135-40 (describing TDR programs for farmland
preservation).
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thus arguably appearing more fair.89 Moreover, both programs are possibly less
susceptible to the shifting political climate often affecting zoning, where deviation
from initial zoning designation often and easily occurs in the face of development
pressure. Yet the cost of PDR programs make them unrealistic for widespread
use, especially in a time of fiscal restraint for most local governments. TDR
programs avoid this problem by providing development rights instead of money,
but are contingent upon the right mix of ingredients, including appropriate
"receiving areas" to succeed. In particular, there must be significant enough land-
use restrictions in place to make the TDRs worth something, along with
conditions suitable to absorb the transferred development. 90 Further, TDR
programs require the stability of zoning restrictions so that the value of TDRs are
not undermined-a relatively rare occurrence 1 For these reasons, few successful
TDR programs have emerged and their promise as a farmland preservation tool is
limited.92
Although TDR and in particular PDR programs certainly have a role to play
in comprehensive farmland preservation programs, their potential is limited. For
this reason, any comprehensive effort must rely on agricultural zoning or other
forms of public land use restrictions. This is best done through a comprehensive
planning process, in which the need to preserve farmland can be appropriately
viewed in the context of other, and at times, competing societal needs, including
affordable housing. The end result, however, will necessarily be restrictions on
some owners' rights to convert to more intensive development, often at a
significant financial cost to the affected landowner.
Despite the central role that zoning must play in farmland preservation, it is
subject to two common and closely related challenges. The first of these is that
the imposition of zoning restrictions to preserve farmland constitutes an
unconstitutional taking of property, especially when it results in significant
diminution in value to the affected landowner. Second, even if not a taking, a
growing number of property owners perceive such restrictions as unfair where the
cost of preservation is placed on landowners instead of the public as a whole. The
next two sections of this Article will address each of these arguments in turn.
89 See, e.g., Coughlin & Keene, supra note 67, at 9 (suggesting in some situations PDRs
more fair than agricultural zoning); Juergensmeyer et al., supra note 87, at 444 (suggesting
TDR programs more fair than zoning in some cases); Lazarus, supra note 12, at 731-32
(suggesting TDR programs are a way to address the legitimate fairness issues that sometimes
arise).
90 See Juergensmeyer et al., supra note 87, at 446-48 (describing how TDR system
works); Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory Approaches: A Comparative Discussion
ofEnvironmental and Land Use Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
565,574-79 (1992) (discussing difficulties in establishing successful TDRprogram)
91 See Juergensmeyer et al., supra note 87, at 447-48; Kayden, supra note 90, at 578.
92 See Kayden, supra note 90, at 576-77 (discussing limited success of TDR programs).
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JIl. TAKINGS AND AGRICULTURAL ZONING
As noted above, an initial issue with public controls on farmland, and in
particular agricultural zoning, is whether they constitute an unconstitutional
taking of property. This is a frequent argument made by owners of agricultural
land when they are forced to forego substantial appreciated value that conversion
to a nonagricultural use would bring. They perceive the often substantial
diminution in value as compared to alternative uses as a taking of property, both
because of the lost economic value and the interference with perceived property
rights. This part of the Article first analyzes such takings claims under current
United States Supreme Court doctrine and then reviews how lower courts have
addressed the issue.93
A. Supreme Court Takings Doctrine
The Supreme Court's takings analysis has gone through a long, and at times,
tortuous path and still remains far from clear.94 The Court first recognized the
concept of a regulatory taking in its seminal decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,95 in which it struck down a state statute that had the effect of requiring
coal companies to keep a portion of coal in the ground to avoid subsidence
damage to surface structures. 96 Although the Court acknowledged that
government could not go on if it had to pay every time its regulations reduced the
value of land, it stated that "if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking."97 The Court concluded that the statute had "gone too far" and constituted
a taking, but failed to explain its conclusion other than to state that the statute
93 For other discussions of whether agricultural zoning constitutes a taking, see REDFELD,
supra note 5, at 20-44; Sam Sheronick, Note, The Accretion of Cement and Steel onto Pime
Iowa Farmland: A Proposalfor a Comprehensive State Agricultural Zoning Plan, 76 IOWA L.
REV. 583,598-604 (1991).
94 Commentators have frequently noted the less than clear state of Supreme Court takings
jurisprudence. See, e.g., ROGER A. CUNNiNGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 514 (2d ed.
1993) (stating a lack of consistent standards has led to confision); J. Peter Byrne, Ten
Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 102
(1995) (describing the jurisprudence as "an unworkable muddle"); Gideon Kanner, Hunting the
Snark, Not the Quark- Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Effort to Formulate
Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 307, 308 (1998) ("[i]ncoherence... has by
now been demonstrated time and again.... "); Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark-
Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH.
L. REv. 91, 92 (1995) ("Regulatory takings are proving to be one of the enduring dilemmas of
the twentieth century.").
95 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
96 See id at 412-13,416.
97 Id at 415.
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made the mining of anthracite coal "commercially impracticable."9 8
Although the precise holding of Pennsylvania Coal is subject to some debate,
it clearly established that the mere regulation of property for otherwise legitimate
purposes might constitute a taking if the economic impact is too severe.99 The
Court gave little guidance, however, as to when that point is reached. It suggested
that diminution in value might be a factor, but failed to clarify how that is
determined other than stating when diminution reaches a "certain magnitude" a
taking occurs. 100 Despite this language, in the years subsequent to Pennsylvania
Coal the Court has consistently rejected takings challenges on the basis of
economic impact alone. Indeed, after Pennsylvania Coal the Court never found a
taking based solely upon economic impact until its recent decision in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,101 which involved a rather extreme fact
situation. Rather, the Court has often upheld restrictions on land-use restrictions
despite substantial diminution in value.102
The leading case typifying the Court's takings jurisprudence during this
period was Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,10 3 where it upheld
the validity of New York City's Landmark Preservation Law against a takings
challenge. In that case, New York City, pursuant to its Landmark Preservation
Law, had designated Grand Central Terminal, owned by Penn Central, as a
"landmark. ' 104 This meant that a Landmark Preservation Commission
("Commission") had to approve any exterior changes to the building, even if they
were consistent with applicable zoning regulations. 0 5 Penn Central sought
approval of two alternative plans to build either a fifty-three story or fifty-five
story addition to the building, both of which met current zoning requirements. 0 6
The Commission rejected both plans on grounds that they would aesthetically
denigrate the landmark,107 in effect eliminating or greatly reducing the previously
existing and quite valuable air rights that Penn Central had. Penn Central then
challenged the application of the law as a taking.10 8
In analyzing the validity of the Landmark Preservation Law, the Supreme
Court began by noting that there was no clear formula for a takings analysis, but it
9 8 1d. at 414.
9 9 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127-28 (1978).
100 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
101 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
102 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (75%
diminution in value).
103 438 U.S. 104 (1977).
10 4 See id at 115-16.
105 Seeid at 112.
106 See id. at 116-17.
10 7 Seeid at 117-18.
108 Seeid. at 119.
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instead addressed takings claims on an ad hoc basis.109 It then identified several
factors to determine whether a taking occurred, including the nature of the
government action, the diminution in value, and most importantly, the degree of
interference with investment-backed expectations. 010 On that basis, the Court held
that the Landmark Preservation Law did not constitute a taking as applied to Penn
Central's property, emphasizing that the regulation still permitted a "reasonable
return" on the land.111
Particularly significant to the Court in determining that the interference with
Penn Central's investment expectations did not constitute a taking was that the
Landmark Preservation Law did not prevent Penn Central from using the property
for its original purpose as purchased. Grand Central had been used for the
previous 65% as a railroad tenninal containing office space and concessions. 112
For that reason the Landmark Preservation Law did not "interfere with what must
be regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning the use of the
parcel."' 13 Thus, even though the Landmark Preservation Law in effect
eliminated more intensive development previously permitted by its zoning, the
assurance of a reasonable return and continuation of previous uses that formed
earlier expectations negated any takings concerns.
The Court's most recent articulation of its takings analysis based on
economic impact comes from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,1 14 a
1992 decision which builds upon the earlier Pennsylvania Coal and Penn Central
decisions. In Lucas, the plaintiff, David Lucas, owned two undeveloped beach-
front lots which permitted residential development at the time he purchased the
property for $975,000.115 Subsequently a coastal preservation law was passed
which had the effect of prohibiting any development on the property.116 Lucas
challenged the restriction as a taking.117 The trial court found that the restriction
rendered the property "valueless" and therefore constituted a taking.118 The South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that even if the regulation left the
property valueless, it was not a taking because of the important public interests
10 9 Seeid at 124.
110 See id
I1d. at 136.
112 See id.
113 See id
114 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Two years after Lucas the Court decided another important
takings case, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). That decision did not focus on
whether economic impact constituted a taking, however, but instead on the standard for
reviewing exactions imposed as part of the development process, a type of taking derivative of
the physical invasion line of cases. See id. at 385.
115 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
116 See id. at 1006-07.
117 Seeid at 1009.
118 See id
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served.'19
The United States Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that although
most takings inquiries are fact specific and ad hoe in nature, it had recognized two
types of categorical takings in its previous cases.120 In such instances, certain
supporting facts establish a taking without a need to balance the respective
interests involved. 121 First are physical invasions, in which the government
invades or grants the right to other parties to intrude physically upon the property
in question.122 In such situations a taking is near automatic, no matter what the
economic impact of the government action. 123
The second type of categorical taking is "where the regulation denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of the land 124 The Court noted that it
had recognized in a number of prior decisions that a taking occurs when a
regulation "denies an owner economically viable use of his land."125 Injustifying
this categorical taking, the Court noted that "in the extraordinary circumstance"
when land has lost all economic viability "it is less realistic to indulge our usual
assumption that the legislature is simply 'adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life.' 126 The Court did state that the loss of all economic viability
would not constitute a taking where the regulation is merely prohibiting a
common law nuisance, since such land use was not part of the landowner's
property interest.127
In recognizing that the loss of economic viability constituted a categorical
taking, the Court was careful not to preclude the possibility of finding a taking
119 M. at 1009-10.
120 See ic
121 See icE at 1015
122 See id
123 See id The Court had previously recognized physical invasions, even when minimal in
nature, as near per se takings. See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419 (1982) (requiring landlords to permit cable companies to run cable wires on
property); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (illustrating navigation servitude
imposed on private marina); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (discussing a law
dealing with overhead flights).
124 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16.
12 5 Id. at 1016 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980)) (alteration in
original) (citations omitted). The Court in Agins had used the "economically viable" standard as
part of a two-part test for takings, stating that a regulation will be a taking if it "does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of
his land." Id. at 260 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1977)) (citations
omitted). The Court used that same articulation of the takings standard in a series of decisions in
the 1980s. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n., 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264,295-96 (1981).
126 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
12 7 Seeid at 1027-31.
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when a restriction reduces but does not altogether eliminate economic viability, In
a footnote, the Court noted that such a restriction might still constitute a taking
under the Court's ad hoc balancing test established in Penn Central.12 8 It did not
clearly define how such a test might operate, but did state that 'the economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant and.., the extent to which the regulation
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations' are keenly relevant' 12 9
to its general takings analysis.
Thus, in Lucas the Court established what might be viewed as a two-fold test
for analyzing whether the economic impact of a regulation constitutes a taking.
First, if the regulation leaves the property owner with no economic viability it is a
categorical taking, absent a finding that the prohibited use would have constituted
a common law nuisance. Second, even if some economic viability remains, a
court is to examine the economic impact and interference with investment-backed
expectations to determine if a taking is to be found. However, such analysis must
be made in the context of Penn Central, where the Court examined the ability of
continued use, as opposed to potential use, and the established nature of the use.
The above analysis suggests that agricultural zoning would rarely constitute a
taking under current Supreme Court standards, even where it results in substantial
diminution in value. It is likely that farming will be viewed as an economically
viable land use, precluding a finding of a categorical taking.130 Although the
Court has not clearly indicated how economic viability is determined, 131 the
primary focus is not on what is lost in terms of potential profit, but what remains
in terms of possible use.132 As long as there is a reasonable ability to generate a
livelihood, there is economic viability. This would normally be the case with
farmland, where an agricultural zoning designation would typically permit
continuation of current activities.
In this sense, farmland preservation can be distinguished from other types of
environmental land-use controls, such as restrictions designed to preserve
wetlands, coastal zones, and wildlife habitat. If such regulations are applied to the
12 8 See id at 1019 n.8 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
129 Id
130 Lower courts that have addressed the economic viability issue have consistently found
agricultural use as economically viable. See, e.g., Grand Land Co. v. Township of
Bethlehem,483 A.2d 818, 820-21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984); City of Virginia Beach v.
Virginia Land Investment Ass'n No. 1,389 S.E.2d 312,314 (Va. 1990).
131 See Oswald, supra note 94, at 117-26.
132 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992) (stating
categorical taking for no economic viability applies "in the extraordinary circumstance when no
productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted"); see also Michael C. Blumm,
The End of Environmental Law? Libertarian Property, Natural Law, and the Just
Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25 ENVTL. L. 171, 175 (1995) (noting economic
viability standard applies only when there are no productive uses of property remaining).
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totality of a landowner's property,' 33 they typically require that the property be
left in its natural state, as was the case in Lucas. This not only precludes
development, but greatly limits any realistic opportunities for economic use.134 In
contrast, agricultural zoning, though prohibiting development permits
continuation of what had been the intended economic use of the property.
For similar reasons, agricultural zoning would not usually constitute a taking
under the Penn Central balancing test which focuses on interference with
investment-backed expectations. This is clearest where an agricultural limitation
has been in place prior to appreciated values and the affected landowner is now
seeking an "upzoning" to a more intensive use. Although refusal to upzone in
such a situation might result in significant loss of potential appreciated value for
the landowner, this can hardly be viewed as a significant interference with
investment-backed expectations. Even where the purchase price reflects the
potential for intensive development, this is speculation on a possible zoning
change and is certainly not the type of investment for which compensation should
be required.135
The issue is somewhat more problematic when property is "downzoned"
from more intensive use to agricultural, resulting in a substantial diminution in
value. Two different scenarios should be distinguished here. First is where the
original investment in the property clearly reflects agricultural use and value, and
only later did the value greatly appreciate, probably due to subsequent
development in the vicinity of the regulated property. This might likely be where,
no matter what the original zoning designation at the time of purchase, the
property was economically best suited for agricultural use with no significant
development pressure. Subsequent to that purchase, the land gradually came
under development pressure, raising the value substantially.
Despite the substantial diminution in value such a scenario might cause, a
133 A critical issue in takings analysis is how the property being regulated is defined, often
known as the "denominator" issue. See Blumm, supra note 132, at 184; Frank I. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967). Although the Court in Lucas suggested there are
still questions regarding how the property is defined, see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17 n.7, the
Court in other contexts has made clear that the relevant property is the parcel as a whole and not
just the segment being regulated. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 497-99 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31
(1978). Thus, if only half of the property is subject to an environmental restriction precluding
development, the economic impact should be assessed according to the economic viability of
the entire parcel. For this reason, significant takings concerns should arise only if environmental
restrictions apply to most or all of the property.
134 The Court in Lucas suggested that leaving property in its natural state was perhaps the
only clear instance in which property would be left with "no economic viability." Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1018.
135 See John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339, 366-67
(1989); Oswald, supra note 94, at 115-16.
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substantial interference with investment-backed expectations so as to constitute a
taking is unlikely. As in Penn Central, the original investment reflects the
permitted agricultural use; the dowrizoning only interferes with opportunities
subsequent to the investment. The lost appreciated value does not so much reflect
the investment of the landowner as a fortuitous windfall from advancing
development, much of it even created by government itself through provision of
infrastructure. 136 Although downzoning in such a situation clearly has an
economic impact on the affected landowner, it likely does not amount to the
degree of interference with investment-backed expectations contemplated by
Penn Central. Indeed, Penn Central itself essentially involved this same scenario,
where what had been permitted development was eliminated, resulting in
significant economic impact, but not interfering with what had been the original
expectation of the property owner.137
More difficult is where property is purchased at a price reflecting permitted
development opportunities, which is then downzoned resulting in substantial
economic loss. In such situations, the landowner's development expectations are
arguably backed by the purchase price, and the diminution in value resulting from
downzoning is an interference so as to constitute a taking. Even here, however, it
is not certain whether the degree of interference constitutes a taking for several
reasons. To be implemented in the first place, zoning necessarily involves
downzoning from previous development opportunities, which inevitably will
affect some recently purchased property. Although never directly addressing the
issue, the Court in upholding various zoning schemes, including that in Penn
Central, has never suggested that an interference with purchase prices in this
manner would be unconstitutional. 138 Indeed, the Court has never clearly
identified an interference with investment-backed expectations that constitutes a
taking,139 while at the same time stating that diminution in value by itself does not
136 See infra notes 243-247 and accompanying text.
137 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136 (stating there was no interference with investment-
backed expectations because property could be used as it had been for the previous 65 years).
138 See id (holding that New York City's Landmark Preservation Law was not a taking);
cf Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (holding that zoning ordinance that limited
development did not constitute a taking); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926) (denying the grant of an injunction to prevent the enforcement of a zoning ordinance).
139 The Court has explicitly or implicitly considered the issue of interference with
investment-backed expectations with regard to land-use regulations in several cases since Penn
Central, without ever finding a taking on that basis. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63 (1981);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. 470, 493-97 (1987); see also Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 294-96 (1981). It has also occasionally
analyzed the extent of interference with investment-backed expectations in regulatory contexts
other than land, such as regulation of pension funds, in several cases saying the interference
with expectations did not constitute a taking. See Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 646-47 (1993); Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,226-28 (1986).
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constitute a taking.140
Second, the Court and commentators have also recognized the notion of
"regulatory risk," a concept that helps inform the reasonableness of any
investment-backed expectations. The Supreme Court recognized this in Lucas,
where it stated, "[i]t seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the
use of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly
enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers .... "-141 This
builds on statements by the Court in other regulatory contexts, in which it has
strongly affimed the idea that the risk of regulation is part of economic life,
which includes the distinct possibility of economic loss.142 The Court has noted
this is particularly true with regard to activities that "[have] long been the source
of public concern and the subject of government regulation."'143 As noted by John
Humbach, this certainly includes the land development field, which has long been
subject to government regulation and, if anything, the trend is toward greater
controls. 44
Commentators have similarly recognized the concept of regulatory risk as
playing an important role in takings analysis. As noted by Frank Michelman,
In a case decided last term, however, Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S.Ct. 2131 (1998) a
four person plurality of the Court found that a requirement under the Coal Act of 1992 that
required a company to pay the health care costs of retired workers employed by the company
before it stopped mining in 1965 was a taking under the Penn Central balancing test. See 118
S.Ct. 2131, 2131 (1998). In particular, the plurality found the Coal Act violated reasonable
investment-backed expectations, both because the distance it reached into the past posed
"substantial questions of fairness" and the nature of the government's past regulation at the time
Eastern conducted business could not have given the company possible notice "that lifetime
health benefits might be guaranteed to retirees several decades later." Id at 2152. However,
Justice Kennedy, the swing vote, expressly rejected that analysis, stating that the takings
analysis was inapplicable to the regulation of pension assets. See id at 2154-58. The four
dissenting Justices similarly rejected the application of the takings analysis to the facts of the
case. See id. at 2164-68. Thus, five of the Justices found the takings analysis inapplicable to the
facts of the case. Moreover, it should be emphasized that even to the extent the plurality found
an interference with investment-backed expectations under the takings clause, it was based on a
very extreme fact pattern, in which a substantial regulatory burden was imposed on a company
nearly three decades after it exited the industry, and the burden was of the type that could not
have been reasonably anticipated at the time it conducted business.
140 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
141 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
142 The Supreme Court has often stated that "[t]hose who do business in the regulated
field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve
the legislative end." FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958); Concrete Pipe, 508
U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (quoting Darlington); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S.
211, 227 (1986) (quoting Darlington); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007
(1984) (stating that one must accept regulatory burdens as part of doing business); Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1976).
143 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1007.
144 See Humbach, supra note 135, at 367-68.
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"regulation [is] an ordinary part of background risk and opportunity, against
which we all take our chances... as investors in property."'145 This includes the
risk that "government may tighten the applicable regulations," 146 leading to a
substantial loss in value from the purchase price. As a practical matter, -purchase
prices should also be discounted by the possibility of regulation. Thus, although
often recognizing that the notion of investment-backed expectations is circular
and extremely ambiguous, a number of commentators have argued persuasively
that the risk of regulation, resulting in a possible diminution in value, is part of
reasonable landowner expectations in property.147
This is not to say that all state interference with land investment can be easily
dismissed on the basis that property owners should have foreseen that regulation
might occur, which is clearly inconsistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence. The
protection of land investment is most reasonably expected, however, when based
on actual development expenditures rather than speculation on future uses.148
Where a landowner has actually spent money developing land, there is a strong
public policy that the landowner's expectations be protected, otherwise incentives
for the development of land, critical to our well-being, are jeopardized.149 But
where the investment is merely the purchase of land for future development,
expectations must be considered contingent at best. Although even here
interference with expectations might constitute a taking, it would need to be in the
context of compelling facts.
The above analysis suggests that in the majority of instances, reasonable
efforts at agricultural zoning should not constitute a taking, even when resulting in
145 Frank I. Michelman, A Skeptical View of "Property Rights" Legislation, 6 FORDHAM
ENVTL. Li. 409,415 (1995).
146 Humbach, supra note 135, at 367.
147 See Humbach, supra note 135, at 367; Daniel Mandelker, Investments-Backed
Expectations in Takings Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215, 233-36 (1995); Michelman, supra note 145,
at415.
148 See Humbach, supra note 135, at 367-68. As a practical matter, land-use law has long
provided substantial protection to actual development of land through its vested rights doctrine.
This body of law says that at a certain point in the development process, usually including
issuance of a building permit together with some reasonable development expenditures, a
landowner has established vested rights in current permitted uses which cannot be subsequently
restricted by government regulations. Although what is necessary to establish vested rights
varies considerably from state to state, in no state is the mere purchase price of undeveloped
land, even when reflecting then permitted land uses, sufficient to establish vested rights.
Perhaps the most obvious way to give content to Penn Central's interference with investment-
backed expectations standard is through vested rights doctrine, saying that at the point of vested
rights investment-backed expectations have been established sufficient to demonstrate a taking
if they are interfered with, absent a nuisance. See Mandelker, supra note 147, at 236-37
(suggesting such an approach).
14 9 See Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights and the
New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265,267-68 (1996).
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significant economic impacts on affected landowners. However, a takings
analysis is necessarily fact sensitive and therefore agricultural zoning might
constitute a taking in some situations. Most obvious, of course, is where it leaves
the landowner with no economic viability. This might occur where the property is
totally unsuitable for agricultural use because of size, location, or soil
conditions. 150 Although the "economic viability" standard itself is murky, where
such a finding is made, a taking should result.
Similarly, even where some economic viability remains, a taking might still
be found under the Penn Central factors. As suggested above, this should not
occur based simply on appreciated value from the time of purchase, or even
where a significant loss occurs from a reasonable market purchase. A taking may
be possible, however, where significant diminution in value occurs, together with
what would appear to be reasonable expectations of development reflected in a
purchase price. This would be particularly true if the property was singled-out for
regulation rather than being part of more comprehensive planning.
As a practical matter, most agricultural zoning should not present any of these
problems. This is particularly true where it occurs in a thoughtful and reasonable
manner, seeking to preserve land best suited for agriculture and integrating such
preservation into broader comprehensive planning. Although affected landowners
might still suffer significant economic consequences, it should not be a taking.
Though establishing the above general analysis, the Supreme Court has not
itself ruled on the substantive merits of an agricultural zoning regulation. 151 The
next section of this Article therefore examines lower court decisions that have
reviewed takings challenges to agricultural zoning. Though these decisions
largely incorporate and reflect Supreme Court takings standards, they also vary
with particular state approaches and sensitivities to the takings issue.
B. Lower Court Decisions
Although not yet generating a substantial body of caselaw, the last several
decades have seen an increasing number of cases reviewing agricultural zoning
restrictions. As often occurs in land-use law, state courts have taken various
150 See generally, e.g., Petersen v. City of Decorah, 259 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa Ct App.
1977) (holding agricultural zoning as applied to property unreasonable and confiscatory);
Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake, 211 N.W.2d 471 (Wis. 1973) (holding agricultural zoning as
applied to property unconstitutional).
151 The Court, in McDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986),
did decide a case in which it was alleged that restricting property to agriculture use constituted a
taking. In McDonald, the property owner had submitted a proposal to subdivide property,
currently farmland, into 159 residential lots, which was rejected by the county for a variety of
reasons particular to the proposal. See id. at 392. The Court rejected the talngs argument on
ripeness grounds, however, stating that denial of a particular proposal did not constitute a final
determination of permitted uses, which was necessary before a takings claim could be
considered. See id. at 348-53.
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approaches, often turning on separate state constitutional protections 152 or
reflecting distinct state law standards for review of zoning decisions.15 3 Even
when ostensibly applying federal standards, state courts often incorporate distinct
analytical approaches. Moreover, as often happens in zoning cases, courts
sometimes fail to distinguish between substantive due process and takings
concerns, blending them together in the course of the court's analysis. This at
times makes difficult a clear understanding of how the court is treating the
"takings" aspect of the case as opposed to the substantive due process aspect.
Despite these potential differences and ambiguities, lower courts have
generally approached takings claims consistent with current Supreme Court
jurisprudence, rejecting takings challenges in the vast majority of cases.154 In
doing so lower courts often apply a two part analysis similar to that articulated by
the Supreme Court, which in essence incorporates the dual constitutional
concerns of substantive due process and takings. 155 Because of the fact sensitive
nature of any takings claim, however, the ultimate outcome in these cases turns
on the specific facts of the case.156 In analyzing the takings dimension of the
above standard, courts have most often focused on whether the landowner
152 See, e.g., Jafay v. Board of County Comm'ns of Boulder County, 848 P.2d 892 (Colo.
1993) (applying provisions of Colorado Constitution).
153 See, e.g., Wilson v. County of McHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
(applying unique Illinois multi-factor balancing test).
154 See generally, e.g., Christensen v. Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161 (9th
Cir. 1993); Barancik v. County of Main, 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1988); Habersham at
Northridge v. Fulton County Georgia, 632 F.Supp. 815 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Gilliland v. City of
Palmdale, 179 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Gisler v. County of Madera, 112 Cal. Rptr.
919, (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); County of Ada v. Henry, 668 P.2d 994 (Idaho 1983); Harvard State
Bank v. County of McHenry, 620 N.E.2d 1360 (111. App. Ct. 1993); Racich v. County of
Boone, 625 N.E.2d 1095 (IIl. App. Ct. 1993); Wilson v. County of McHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426
(Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Vanderburgh County Bd. of Comm'ns v. Rittenhouse, 575 N.E.2d 663
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Bell River Assocs. v. Charles Township of China, 565 N.W.2d 695
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Woolston v. Monticello Orderly Annexation Area Bd., No. Co-90-
1389, 1990 WL 204290, at *1 (Minn. App. Dec. 18, 1990); Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands
Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251 (NJ. 1991); Eck v. City of Bismark, 283 N.W.2d 193 (N.D. 1979);
Wilson v. Trustees Union Township, No. CA98-06-036, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5025, at *1
(Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1998); Smythe v. Butler Township, 620 N.E.2d 901 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993); Oregonians in Action v. Land Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 854 P.2d 1010 (Or. Ct.
App. 1993); Murray v. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n, 865 P.2d 1319 (Or. Ct. App. 1993);
Joyce v. City of Portland, 546 P.2d 1100 (Or. Ct. App. 1976); Codorus Township v. Rodgers,
492 A.2d 73 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985); Chokecherry Hills Estate, Inc. v. Deuel County, 294
N.W.2d 654 (S.D. 1980); see also, Van Arsdel v. Township of Addison, 195 N.W.2d 21 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1972) (upholding agricultural zoning against substantive due process challenge).
155 See Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251, 257 (N. J. 1991).
156 See id (stating the "application of takings principles requires a fact-sensitive
examination of the regulatory scheme.. -:); see also Codorus Township, 492 A.3d at 76
(holding that the validity of agricultural restriction must be determined in specific context).
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retained a reasonable or economically viable use of the land.157 In doing so,
courts have clearly put the burden on the affected property owner to establish that
there is no reasonable or economically viable use left of the property. Thus, in
several cases courts have readily dismissed takings challenges by saying that the
owner failed to carry the burden that there were no economically viable uses of
the property.' 58
A particularly thorough opinion in analyzing takings challenges to
agricultural zoning is Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Commissionn,159 in
which the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the agricultural zoning provisions
of the Pinelands Protection Act. Those provisions significantly limited residential
development in "Agricultural Production Zones," primarily restricting
development to one unit per forty acres, with actual development clustered on
one-acre lots and a permanent deed restriction on the remaining land.160 The
plaintiff, owner of a 217 acre farm, desired to subdivide his property into 14 to 17
acre "farmettes," which was denied.161 He then challenged the restriction as an
unconstitutional taking and sought compensation. 162
The court began its analysis by emphasizing the important societal interests in
farmland preservation, and noted that the restrictions on residential development
clearly furthered those interests.163 It then stated that the critical remaining
question was whether the economic impact interfered to an "impermissible
degree" with valuable property rights, in essence, asking whether it was a
taking.164 It began its analysis by noting that mere diminution in value,
"impairment of marketability," and reduced income or profits do not by
themselves constitute a taking.165 Rather, a taking occurs only if a regulation
denies "all practical use of property" or "substantially destroys the beneficial use
of private property." 166 Thus, the proper focus is on the "beneficial or economic
uses allowed to a property owner" in a particular context, rather than what has
157 See Christensen, 995 F.2d at 165; Jafay v. Board of County Comm'rs of Boulder
County, 848 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1993); County ofAda, 678 P.2d at 997; Vanderburgh, 575 N.E.2d
at 67-68; Bell River Assocs., 565 N.W.2d at 700; Woolston, 1990 WL 204290, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 18, 1990); Gardner, 593 A.2d at 257; Murray, 865 P.2d at 1320; Wilson, 1998 Ohio
App. LEXIS 5025, at *12.
158 See Christensen, 995 F.2d at 165; BellRiver Assocs., 565 N.W.2d at 699-700; Wilson,
1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5025, at *12; Murray, 865 P.2d at 1320.
159 593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991).
160 See id at 256.
161 See id at 253, 256.
162 See id. at 253.
163 See iL at 257-59.
164 I. at 259.
16 51 Id at 259-60.
166 Id. at 260.
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been lost.167
The court then analyzed the agricultural zoning question, drawing close
comparisons to the Supreme Court's takings analysis in Penn Central. It noted
that, like Penn Central, the regulation permitted the property owner to continue
existing use of the property.' 68 The court also noted that under the facts of the
case the plaintiff could "gainfully use all of his property," which under the
particular regulation permitted building up to five homes in a cluster
arrangement.' 69 Finally, there was no showing of interference with investment-
backed expectations. 170
Most lower court decisions, though not engaging in the same level of analysis
as Gardner, essentially come to the same conclusion-agricultural zoning is not a
taking as long as the land is suitable for agricultural use and is economically
viable. 171 This is particularly true where the property was purchased for
agricultural use and thus, there is no interference with investment-backed
expectations. 172 Even where property has been newly zoned, courts have not
found a taking on that basis alone. 173 Only the Idaho Supreme Court, speaking in
dictum, suggested it might under its own constitution find a taking where
substantial diminution in value results from downzoning, although it
acknowledged it would probably not be a taking under federal standards. 174
In a few cases, however, courts focusing on economic viability or reasonable
use have found takings to exist where the land was truly unsuitable for farming
activity. This has typically involved situations where the agricultural classification
had been used as a "holding" restriction until the government was ready to
167 Id.
168 See id at 261.
169 Id.
170 See id.
171 See cases cited supra note 157.
172 See, e.g., Habersham at Northridge v. Fulton County Ga., 632 F.Supp. 815, 823 (N.D.
Ga. 1985); Gilliland v. City of Palmdale, 179 Cal. Rptr. 627, 632-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981);
Woolston v. Monticello Orderly Annexation Area Bd., No. Co-90-1389, 1990 WL 204290, at
*2 (Minn. Ct App. Dec. 18, 1990); Chokecherry Hills Estates, Inc. v. Deuel County, 294
N.W.2d 654,656 (S.D. 1980).
173 See Christensen v. Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161, 163 (9th Cir. 1993);
Gisler v. County of Madera, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919, 922-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); Gardner v. New
Jersey Pinelands, 593 A2d 251 (N.J. 1991).
174 See generally County of Ada v. Henry, 668 P.2d 994 (Idaho 1983). In Ada the court
held that an agricultural zoning restriction did not constitute a taking when the landowners had
knowledge of the restrictions when they purchased the land. See id. at 997. It further noted in
dictum that under the then recently decided United States Supreme Court decision in Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), a taking would not occur even if property is downzoned
subsequent to purchase as long as "some residual value remains in the property."Ada, 668 P.2d
at 997. It strongly suggested, however, that it might well find a taking in such an instance under
its own state constitution. See id.
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consider development later. For example, in Peterson v. City of Decorah,175 the
Iowa Court of Appeals found an agricultural zoning "unreasonable and
confiscatory" where the city acknowledged it zoned the property agricultural as a
holding classification, even though it was unsuitable for agricultural use and had
not been productive for years. 176 Similarly, in Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake,177
the Wisconsin Supreme Court found an agricultural restriction invalid where it
was again admittedly used as a "holding" classification for future use,178 despite
the unsuitability of the property for farming. Indeed, as noted by the court, the
land had a "negative value" as farmland since it would cost between $150 and
$200 per acre to put the land back into farming condition, and its value as
farnland would then be $75 per acre.179
As suggested above, the majority of lower court decisions have focused on
economic viability in analyzing whether agricultural zoning constitutes a taking.
However, the state which has decided the most agricultural zoning cases, Illinois,
takes a more distinctive approach, deciding zoning cases under a unique multi-
factor balancing test, known as the La Salle Bank test.180 This test requires courts
to resolve zoning cases by balancing eight factors, including the following:
examination of surrounding zoning designations, diminution in property value,
the extent to which the zoning furthers the public welfare, the relative gain to the
public and hardship to the restricted landowner, the suitability of the property as
zoned, and the care of land-use planning behind the decision.181 These factors,
which blend both substantive due process and takings concerns, tend to lead to
greater scrutiny of zoning decisions than typically found in most other states.
In an early and influential decision, Wilson v. County of McHenry,182 the
Illinois Court of Appeals, in a consolidation of two separate cases, held that an
agricultural zoning designation requiring a minimum of 160 acre lots was valid
under the above factors. The first case involved property initially zoned for one
and one-eighth acre lots when the plaintiff bought it, which was later rezoned to a
minimum lot size of 5 acres and eventually to the 160 acre minimum, which was
175 259 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa Ct. App. 1977).
176 Id. at 554-55.
177 211 N.W.2d 471 (Wis. 1973).
178 Seeid at 476-77.
179 Id. at 474.
180 The La Salle Bank test emerged from a seminal Illinois zoning case, La Salle Nat'l
Bank v. County of Cook, 145 N.E.2d 65 (iIl. 1957), in which the Illinois Supreme Court
articulated the basic factors that should be balanced in reviewing the validity of a zoning
restriction. The number of factors have been expanded slightly over the years, but it continues
to form the basic test that is applied in all Illinois zoning cases.
181 See, e.g., Twigg v. County of Will, 627 N.E.2d 742, 745 (ill. App. Ct. 1994); Harvard
State Bank v. County of McHenry, 620 N.E.2d 1360, 1362 (l. App. Ct. 1993); Racich v.
County of Boone, 625 N.E.2d 1095, 1098-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
182 416 N.E.2d 426 (111. App. Ct. 1981).
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challenged as a taldng.183 The evidence also indicated that the property was worth
$18,000 to $20,000 per lot for 1 acre residential development but less than
$4,000 per acre as zoned. 184 In the second case, the owner had owned the land for
twenty years prior to the rezoning, and evidence indicated the property was worth
$1,440,000 for 1 acre residential development but only $500,000 as farmland. 185
As then operated, the farms in both cases were only marginally successful
economically, although there was evidence that better management practices
could improve their yield and economic success. 186 There was also conflicting
evidence in both cases about how much of the property was prime farmland.187
The court upheld the validity of the minimum 160 acre lot requirement as
applied to both properties, finding that neither landowner had carried the burden
of showing the unreasonableness of the restriction. Particularly significant to the
court was the fact that the predominate land use in the vicinity of both properties
was agricultural and that the zoning had occurred pursuant to a comprehensive
planning process. 188 The court also stressed that neither lost profit nor diminution
in value by themselves were sufficient to invalidate a zoning when a strong public
interest exists. 189 The court found such a strong public interest in the preservation
of good farmland. 190
Several more recent Illinois decisions have similarly upheld agricultural
zoning restrictions.1 91 In Harvard State Bank, the court upheld an agricultural
restriction as applied to a 64.5 acre parcel of land. 192 In recognizing the validity
of the agricultural restriction, the court emphasized the dominant agricultural use
of surrounding property, the productivity of the land in question, and the existence
of a comprehensive plan. 193 It also noted that although the property would be
worth twice as much if used for residential development 94 the plaintiffs bought
the land zoned agricultural, and therefore there was no interference with their
expectations. Similarly, in Racich v. County of Boone,195 the court upheld the
validity of an agricultural zoning restriction, stressing the comprehensive plan and
183 See id at 427-28.
184 Id. at 429.
185 See id at 432.
186 See id at 429-31.
187 See id at 428-32.
188 See id
189 See id at 429.
19 0 See id at 430.
191 See Harvard State Bank v. County of McHenry, 620 N.E.2d 1360 (111. App. Ct. 1993).
192 See id at 1364-66.
193 The parcel was worth $258,000 zoned agricultural, whereas it would be worth
$516,000 if zoned to permit residential development on one acre lots. See id. at 1363.
194 See id at 1363-64. The court also noted that even though the property was zoned
agricultural, it had increased in value by $32,000 from the time the plaintiffs had purchased it.
195 625 N.E.2d 1095 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
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the thoroughness of the farmland rating system, and that any loss in value was a
mere "expectancy." 196
However, on several occasions Illinois courts have struck down agricultural
zoning under its multi-factor balancing. In two earlier cases, Semja v. County of
Boone1 97 and Pettee v. County ofDeKalb,198 the property was largely unsuitable
for agricultural use. In Semja a majority of the property was comprised of either
woods or "sub-marginal" farmland. 199 Similarly, in Pettee a substantial part of the
property had significant drainage problems; it was therefore unsuitable for
farming.200
Illinois courts again struck down agricultural zoning provisions in two more
recent decisions-Harris Bank of Hinsdale v. County ofKendall2 1 and Twigg v.
County of Will.202 Significantly, unlike Semja and Pettee, there was no indication
in either Harris Bank or Twigg that the property was unsuitable for farming or
could not be profitable with that use.203 Nevertheless, both decisions upheld trial
court determinations that found the restrictions invalid under a balancing of the La
Salle factors.204 Although the courts considered several factors, including the
compatibility of the proposed changes with surrounding uses, both particularly
emphasized the lack of thoughtful planning evidenced in the agricultural
restrictions. In Haris Bank the court stressed that the zoning was inconsistent
with the county's own comprehensive plan, which placed the property in an
"urbanizing area."205 Similarly, in Twigg, the court characterized the zoning of
the entire area, including the land in question, as being done in an "arbitrary"
manner and that the "land use plan was not carefully designed 20 6 Neither court
placed much emphasis on the economic impact-with the Twigg court noting it
was "not determinative," but a factor in the landowner's favor,207 while the
Harris Bank court ignored it altogether.208
Generally speaking, these Illinois cases applying the unique La Salle
balancing test apply a level of scrutiny greater than found in most states when
196 See id at 1098-99.
197 339 N.E.2d 452 (111. App. Ct. 1975).
198 376 N.E.2d 720 (11. App. Ct. 1978).
199 See Semja, 339 N.E.2d at 455.
200 See Pettee, 376 N.E.2d at 725.
201 625 N.E.2d 845 (111. App. Ct. 1993).
202 627 N.E.2d 742 (111. App. Ct. 1994).
2 03 See Twigg, 627 N.E.2d at 746; Harris, 625 N.E.2d at 846.
204 Both courts stressed deference to how the trial courts assessed and weighed the La
Salle Bank factors. See Twigg, 627 N.E.2d at 745; Harris, 625 N.E2d at 848-50.
20 5 See Harris, 625 N.E.2d at 846.
20 6 See Twigg, 627 N.E.2d at 746.
2 07 See idc at 748.
20 8 See Harris, 625 N.E.2d at 845-51.
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reviewing zoning decisions. 20 9 Moreover, the test itself is a blend of several
considerations, including both substantive due process and takings concerns, and
thus does not fit neatly into a more traditional takings analysis. Nevertheless, the
cases generally affirm that if done right, agricultural zoning should not pose
takings problems. Importantly, though recognizing that the economic impact on
the affected landowner is a factor to be considered, the cases indicate that this
alone will not result in a taking when balanced against benefits to the public.210
Rather, agricultural zoning will be invalid only when the property is unsuitable
for agricultural use, or the restriction is not pursuant to sound zoning principles,
such as proper use of a comprehensive plan.
It should be noted, of course, that courts in any jurisdiction will occasionally
invalidate agricultural zoning on grounds other than takings. For example, in City
of Virginia Beach v. Virginia Land Assessment Assoc. No. 1,2 11 the Virginia
Supreme Court struck down an attempt to downzone four hundred acres of land
from a planned unit development to an agricultural district Virginia law required
that for such "piecemeal" downzoning to be valid, a "change or mistake" from the
prior zoning had to be shown,2 12 which the city failed to do. The city admitted
that there were no changed circumstances to justify the rezoning, nor had any
fraud or mistake been shown 2 13 Importantly, however, the court also rejected the
landowner's claim for interim damages, specifically stating that the downzoning
did not constitute a taking because the agricultural restriction did not deprive the
owner of "all economically viable use of the property."214
An earlier and often cited decision that struck down an agricultural zoning
scheme is Hopewell Township Board of Supervisors v. Golla.2 15 There the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed a sliding scale agricultural zoning
ordinance that permitted clustering of residential units, but permitted no more
than five contiguous one and one-half acre residential lots, regardless of the size
209 Commentators have generally characterized Illinois courts as more closely scrutinizing
zoning decisions than courts in other states. See ROBERT C. ELuiCKsON & A. DAN TARLOCK,
LAND-UsE CONTROLS 75-76 (1981); NORmAN WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING
§ 6.16 (1988).
210 See, e.g., Racich v. County of Boone, 625 N.E.2d 1095, 1098-99 (1l. App. Ct. 1993);
Wilson v. County of McHenry, 416 N.Eld 426,429 (111. App. Ct. 1981).
211 389 S.E2d 312 (Va. 1990).
212 Id at 314. Several states follow what is known as the "change or mistake" rule in
reviewing rezonings. This rule states that for a rezoning to be valid the local government must
show either that conditions have changed since the original zoning to justify the change or that
the original zoning was based on a mistake of some type. See generally, DANIEL MANDELKER,
LAND USE LAWs 227-29 (2d ed. 1988).
2 13 See irginia Land Assessment Assoc., 389 S.E.2d at 314.
214 Id; see generally Grand Land Co. v. Township of Bethlehem, 483 A.2d 818 (N.J.
1984) (invalidating restriction but specifically stating that agricultural zoning did not constitute
a taking because it permitted economically viable use of the property).
215 452 A.2d 1337 (Pa. 1982).
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of the overall tract.216 As applied to the plaintiff's 140 acres, this permitted a 72
acre development and a residual 132 acre farm. 17 A plurality of the court found
the ordinance unconstitutional for two reasons. First, by limiting development to
no more than five lots "regardless of the size of the original tract, an unreasonably
severe limitation [was] placed upon permissible land uses."2 18 In this regard it
also stated that the need to establish "an agricultural tract as large as 132 1/2
acres" was not clearly shown. 119 Second, it also found that the scheme
unreasonably discriminated against large lot owners in favor of small lot owners
by limiting total residential lots to five.220
Although Hopewell touched upon takings concerns in finding the scheme
unreasonably severe upon large lot owners, its analysis was primarily grounded in
substantive due process. 221 Moreover, Hopewell was greatly limited three years
later in Boundary Drive Associates v. Shrewsbury Township Board of
Supervisors,222 where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld another
agricultural zoning ordinance using a sliding scale allocation method. The
ordinance was very similar to the one struck down in Hopewell, but did not cap
the maximum number of residences at a particular point, instead permitting one
additional residential unit per thirty acres of land. However, it did impose a
maximum of two dwellings permitted on prime farmland, regardless of tract
size.
2 2 3
The court upheld this sliding-scale allocation scheme as constitutional,
distinguishing it from Hopewell on the basis that, unlike Hopewell, it related
residential development to tract size.224 However, it also upheld the maximum
two-dwelling limit on prime farmland irrespective of tract size, acknowledging it
was very similar to the fixed scale struck down in Hopewell, but stating it should
be viewed as part of the broader scheme.225 As a practical matter, Shrewsbury
significantly limited Hopewell and provides Pennsylvania local governments with
substantial flexibility in implementing agricultural zoning. In particular,
Shrewsbury affirmed the validity of large lot agricultural zoning as a means of
preserving farmland, and in the case of prime farmland, the decision approved the
use ofpotentially significant restrictions.
2 16 See id at 1338-39.
217 See id at 1343.
218/Id
.
2 19 fd
.
220 See id
221 See Codorus Township v. Rodgers, 492 A.2d 73, 75 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (stating
that the "thrust" of Hopewell was directed at irrational results under substantive due process).
222 491 A.2d 86 (Pa. 1985).
223 See id. at 88-89.
224 See id. at 91.
225 See id. at 92.
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In sun, lower courts have generally affirmed the constitutional validity of
agricultural zoning, and in particular that it should not pose a takings problem if
done pursuant to sound planning.226 Although often blending substantive due
process with takings concerns, and at times turning on the unique features of state
law, the decisions largely affirm and are consistent with Supreme Court takings
jurisprudence. In particular, lower courts have consistently rejected takings
challenges as long as the property was economically viable as farmland, even
when there was a substantial diminution in property value. The only apparent
exceptions to this are the Harris Bank and Twigg decisions in Illinois, both of
which not only applied that state's unique balancing test, but also emphasized the
lack of proper planning in zoning the property agricultural.2 27 On the other hand,
courts have been willing to strike down agricultural zoning in limited situations,
such as where the property is truly unsuitable for farming.2 28
Significantly, these cases clearly establish, consistent with the Supreme
Court's own analysis, that substantial diminution in value or economic impact on
the landowner is not enough to establish a taking. Even Illinois courts, which
apply the most scrutiny to zoning restrictions and include diminution in value as a
factor in their analysis, have not placed much emphasis on it. However, the
question remains whether substantial diminution in value pursuant to agricultural
zoning, though not constituting an unconstitutional taking, is nevertheless unfair
to landowners and should be avoided for that reason. The next section will
address that issue.
IV. FAIRNEss IN FARMLAND PRESERVATION
Beyond the constitutional challenge that agricultural zoning constitutes a
taking, is the equally common assertion that it is unfair because it forces a few
landowners to bear the cost of preserving farmland for the benefit of many. This
fairness argument is not unique to farmland preservation, but is often asserted
with a variety of environmental regulations.2 29 However, it is most forcefully
226 See cases cited supra note 154.
227 See Twigg v. County of Will, 627 N.E2d 742,746 (111. App. Ct. 1994); Harris Bank of
Hinsdale v. County of Kendall, 625 N.E.2d 845, 851 (111. App. Ct. 1993).
228 See Semja v. County of Boone, 339 N.E.2d 452,453-55 (111. App. Ct. 1975); Petersen
v. City of Decorah, 259 N.W.2d 553, 554-55 (Iowa 1977); Kmiec v. Town of Spider, 211
N.W.2d 471,476-77 (Wis. 1973).
22 9 See Nancie G. Marzulla, State Private Property Rights Initiatives as a Response to
"Environmental Takings", 46 S.C.L. REV. 613, 636 (1995); see also Marianne Lavelle, The
"Property Rights", NAT'L L.J., May 10, 1993 at 1, 34 (discussing impetus for property rights
movement); Private Property Rights and Environmental Laws: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Env't. & Pub. Works, 104th Cong. 171, 172 (1995) (statement of Steven J.
Eagle, professor at George Mason Law School) (stating that compensation required as a matter
of faimess); see id. at 163-65 (statement of Jonathan Adler, Associate Director of
Environmental Studies for the Competitive Enterprise Institute) (stating that if the public wants
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made with regard to environmental regulations that restrict environmentally
sensitive land, which often affect a limited number of property owners with
substantial diminution in value to bestow benefits on society as a whole.
The essence of the fairness argument is that environmental regulations, like
farmland preservation, force a few landowners to bear the cost of preserving
farmland for the benefit of society more generally. As noted earlier, the need for
government intervention to preserve farmland is that most of the benefits from
preservation in terms of food security and environmental amenities go to society
as a whole, rather than the affected landowner.230 Thus, the argument is made that
if most of the benefits from farmland preservation go to society as a whole, then
the cost of preservation should be placed on society as well.
The perceived unfairness of requiring affected landowners to bear the cost of
agricultural preservation is exacerbated by what might be seen as two distinctions
between restrictions on environmentally sensitive land and more typical zoning
restrictions. First, whereas most zoning restrictions typically permit some
development such as single-family residential, restrictions on environmentally
sensitive land prohibit development altogether. This is viewed as a more extreme
regulation and often, though not inevitably, results in a greater diminution in
value than might result from other zoning regulations. 31
Second, efforts to preserve environmentally sensitive land often are perceived
as affecting only a limited number of property owners and lack the reciprocal
benefits often found in other zoning contexts. For example, a typical single-family
zoning restriction will apply evenly to a wide number of property owners, thus
imposing comparable burdens and bestowing benefits to a large number of
similarly situated landowners. In contrast, restrictions on environmentally
sensitive land often restrict a more limited number of property owners with the
benefits more clearly going to broader society.232
to protect private land with environmental value, then the public should be willing to pay for it
through provision of compensation).
230 In economic terms this would be viewed as an "externality" problem, because most of
the benefits of farmland preservation will be external to the decisionmaking process in that they
go to society as a whole. Although externalities do not always result in an inefficient use of
resources, they often do by failing to consider the full range of cost and benefits from the
decision. This might well be the case with regard to agricultural zoning.
231 The actual diminution in value will, of course, depend on various factors, particularly
the percentage of the property subject to the restriction. If the entire parcel is subject to a
restriction to keep the property in its natural state, the diminution in value can be substantial,
since it likely prohibits development altogether. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992) (stating that the most obvious instance of"no economic viability"
is where property must be left in its natural state).
2 32 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings
and Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REv. 305, 361 (1997) (noting how under the Endangered Species
Act "[r]egulated property owners constitute only a small fraction of the population that enjoys
[the Act's] benefits," yet neighbors and the broader public who enjoy the benefits do not have
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As thus presented, the fairness argument does not necessarily dispute the
wisdom of farmland preservation, but instead questions who should pay for it.
Whatever the merits of preservation, it is arguably unfair to force a few
landowners to bear the burden of bestowing benefits on the rest of society.2 33
Thus, the argument is made that if the benefits from preservation go to society as
a whole, then society should pay for such benefits in the form of compensation to
affected landowners. 234 For this reason alternative preservation schemes
involving Purchase of Development Rights or Transferrable Development Rights
are viewed as more equitable in that they shift the cost of preservation from the
regulated landowner back to society.
The above fairness argument-very much at the heart of the current property
rights debate and farmland preservation efforts-has substantial intuitive appeal.
Moreover, despite its elusive nature, fairness remains a central component of any
serious discussion of the relative balance of property rights and environmental
regulation.235 Even assuming the constitutionality of agricultural zoning, fairness
is an important component in setting policy and affects the political acceptability
of alternative outcomes. 236 Thus, some discussion of the fairness of agricultural
zoning, beyond its general constitutionality, is warranted.
Though quite important the idea of fairness in land use controls is admittedly
both vague and quite subjective. However, as a general matter, it most sensibly
concerns how the burdens and benefits of land use controls should be shared and
distributed across society. More particularly, the fairness critique of agricultural
zoning turns on a perception that regulated property owners are forced to give up
substantial property interests, reflected in diminution of property values, in order
to pay).
233 One leading proponent of the property rights movement puts it this way: "The property
rights movement is not seeking less environmental protection; it asks only that a few unlucky
landowners not be forced to bear an unfair share of the burdens imposed by such regulations."
Marzulla, supra note 229, at 639.
2 34 See Michael M. Berger, Dollars and Damages: A Debate-Yes! It's the Fair Thing to
Do, PLANNING, Mar. 1996, at 22-24 (arguing in favor of legislation requiring compensation to
landowners when environmental regulations diminish property values).
235 Courts and commentators have often noted that fairness is a central concern in
analyzing regulatory takings. In recent years the Supreme Court has often stated that the takings
clause is "designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be bome by the public as a whole." Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384
(1994) (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 123-24 (1977) (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49). Commentators have similarly
noted the centrality of fairness in takings jurisprudence. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLIncs 6 (1995); Frank I. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1171-72 (1967); see also Lazarus, supra note 12 (discussing
importance of addressing fairness concerns in environmental law).
236 See Lazarus, supra note 12.
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to bestow benefits on the rest of society.
Though it admittedly has some intuitive appeal, the argument that agricultural
zoning is inherently unfair is overstated for several basic reasons. First, it
presumes that the entire profit potential of private property has somehow been
earned by the landowner, when in fact a substantial portion of private property
value is often established by government "givings." Recognizing this necessarily
tempers the perception of unfairness when agricultural zoning reduces profit
potential. Second, the concept of fairness concerns an understanding of not only
how burdens and benefits are distributed within a single government action, but
must also focus on the reciprocal nature of burdens and benefits within society
more broadly. Even though one might be burdened by a particular land use
regulation, fairness is provided through reciprocal benefits in other regulatory
contexts. Third, the fairness critique of agricultural zoning emphasizes the private
development perspective of property rights, without recognizing the social
dimension of property ownership integral to our legal system. This social
dimension of property indicates that restricting land to agricultural use for the
common good can be viewed as an inherent limitation in the property rather than
a deprivation of rights.
Each of these three points will be discussed below briefly. Together they
indicate that agricultural zoning is not inherently unfair, even when it results in
substantial diminution in value. This is not to say that agricultural zoning is never
unfair; certainly it, like any other land use control, might be unfair as applied to a
particular tract of land. Nor should it preclude some modified use of PDR or TDR
programs to provide some compensation to landowners in order to more evenly
distribute the regulatory burden between affected landowners and the broader
public. But viewed from a broad perspective, the following subsections
demonstrate that restricting land to agricultural use without accompanying
compensation should not be viewed as inherently unfair.
A. "Givings" and Fairness
Central to the fairness critique of agricultural zoning is the idea that regulated
property owners suffer substantial economic loss in order to benefit the rest of
society. This presupposes that landowners have a valid claim to all the market
value of their property. Thus, when the value of land is greatly reduced by
agricultural zoning relative to development potential, landowners perceive a
substantial loss of their wealth to the public as a whole.
The perceived unfairness of lost value is substantially lessened, however,
when recognizing that a substantial portion of that value was added by
government activity to begin with. As noted by various commentators, much of
the value of farmland is a result of government givings, actions by government
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which enhance the value of the regulated land.237 This might occur with farmland
in numerous ways, such as farm subsidy programs238 and mortgage deductions,
both of which indirectly enhance farmland values. 239
Government action also enhances land values by minimizing the harms that
might otherwise affect landowners, especially those arising from incompatible
land uses. Thus, the very scheme of restricting property use adds significant value
to neighboring property.240 Specifically, the increased value of agricultural land
in alternative, residential use in part exists because government zoning would
protect any residential development from conflicting industrial and commercial
uses. Any arguments based on diminution in value necessarily reflect property
values largely enhanced by protective government regulatory schemes. As
recently noted by several leading land use scholars, "much of the value that some
advocates today want to protect against regulation exists in significant part
because of the protection of the regulatory system they challenge."241
Perhaps the most obvious example of government givings in regard to
farmland subject to development pressure is basic infrastructure support that
makes land developable in the first instance. This is particularly relevant with
regard to farmland preservation issues, where conversion pressure and enhanced
land values are the result of government support. Therefore, the value of land for
intensive development largely reflects government investment rather than the
mere initiative of landowners. In particular, road and other infrasitructure support,
which makes land developable in the first instance, are paid primarily by general
tax revenues and yet often result in disproportionate financial benefit to
undeveloped land, often farmland, in proximity to development. It is not
obviously unfair in such situations to preserve farmland with the result that some
of the publicly created value of the land is, in effect, returned to the public.
Edward Thompson makes this point forcefully in the context of the Lucas
decision, discussing the various ways in which the value of Mr. Lucas's property
237 See Private Property Rights and Environmental Laws: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Env't & Pub. Works, 104th Cong. 163, 163-65 (1995) (statement of C. Ford
Runge, Professor, Dept. of Agriculture and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota)
(discussing various ways government actions enhance private property values); Donald L.
Elliott, Givings and Takings, LAND USE L. AND ZONING DIG., Jan. 1996, at 3; Edward
Thompson, Jr., The Government Giveth, ENVTL. FORUM, MarJApr. 1994 at 22.2 38 See C. Ford Runge and Tim Searchinger, Who's Really Getting Taken? The Last
Thing We Need is a Vast New Entitlement Program for Landowners, Nmv DEMOCRAT,
SeptJOct. 1995, at 27,28; Thompson, supra note 237, at 22-23.
239 See Thompson, supra note 237, at 23 (noting that income tax deduction for mortgage
interest is capitalized into home values).
2 4 0 See DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 328-29 (2d ed. 1986).
241 Daniel R. Mandelker et al., Good Planning, Consistent Regulation, and Fair Decision-
Making: A Prescription for Avoiding Takings Challenges, at 10 (1996) (paper prepared for
American Planning Association's Property Rights Task Force, on file with author).
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was enhanced by government "givings." He states:
Whether or not one agrees with the decision in his case, the fact remains that
both Lucas's ability to build on the beach and the value of his beachfront lots
were augmented by government action. Public authorities had constructed a
bridge to provide access to the island, roads to drive on, water and sewage
systems to serve the houses, and beach protection measures to prevent them from
washing away. On top of that, the government has helped underwrite flood
insurance to cushion the loss when those measures fail. All of these taxpayer-
financed improvements contributed to the value of Lucas's property and in all
likelihood spelled the difference between its being attractive for development
and a financially worthless strip of shifting sand. In effect, much of the
government's financial exposure for taking the Lucas property was attributable
to the government itself.242
Thompson does not necessarily disagree with the Lucas result, but argues for
recognition of government givings as well as takings in the property rights debate.
He further notes the potential problem of property owners "double dipping in the
public treasury" by receiving benefits from government actions which give
significant value to land and then being compensated when environmental
regulations reduce land values.243 This is potentially unfair to the public at large
by requiring that they, in effect, pay affected landowners twice: once through
paying for infrmructure supports that greatly enhance property values, and a
second time through compensatory payments when environmental regulations
diminish property values.
This discussion of givings is not meant to ignore or minimize the role of
private enterprise in enhancing land values. Certainly property worth reflects
substantial private as well as public initiative. Nor is it meant to completely
foreclose the possibility of some compensatory scheme in preserving farmland.
However, it does indicate that reduced land values often reflect only a taking back
of what the government itself has created, which can hardly be labeled unfair.244
242 Thompson, supra note 237, at 22.
243 See id. at 26.
244 It is important to note, of course, that in recent years developers have been increasingly
required to pay for some infrastructure costs through exaction requirements, typically in the
form of land dedications and impact fees. See generally ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSE A.
GOMEZ-IBANEZ, REGULATION FOR REveUE, 19-20,35-39 (1994); Gus Bauman & William H.
Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of American Practices, 50 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 62 (1987). It might therefore be argued that through the practice of
exactions landowners themselves pay for the enhanced value of the land. This is subject to two
significant limitations. First, property values are substantially enhanced by government
activities not typically financed by exactions, such as major highways. Second, the amount of
exactions can only correspond to the burden imposed by the development, not the enhanced
property values created by the infrastructure. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 375
(1994) (requiring "rough proportionality" between exaction and development impact). As a
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It also suggests that loss of truly deserved land value is often not nearly as great as
might at first appear. To the extent it does exist, it is often more attenuated and
must be seen in the context of the give and take of broader regulatory efforts,
which is the focus of the next subsection of this Article.
B. Reciprocity and Distributive Fairness
Closely related to the idea of government givings is the concept of
reciprocity, which similarly suggests that agricultural zoning is not inherently
unfair. Frequently emphasized by the Supreme Court in its takings analysis,2 45
reciprocity essentially refers to the idea that government regulations typically
bestow both reciprocal benefits and burdens. In a limited sense, this might refer
only to benefits and burdens flowing from the same regulation, what might be
called specific reciprocity.246 In the case of zoning, for example, individual
landowners are burdened by restrictions placed on their land, but receive benefits
from similar restrictions placed on other property. As a practical matter, the
benefits and burdens from a specific regulation might not be distributed evenly,
nor do the benefits necessarily outweigh the burdens. Yet reciprocal benefits
serve to at least partially offset losses and burdens imposed by the same
regulation.
Reciprocity can also be viewed from a more general perspective, in which the
reciprocal benefits and burdens of regulatory life in general are considered, as
opposed to only those flowing from a specific regulation.2 47 The Supreme Court
is arguably alluding to general reciprocity when it says that it is usually fair to
assume that legislation is simply "adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life" to secure an "average reciprocity of advantage."248 Thus, even if a particular
restriction might not provide significant reciprocity for an affected party, there are
likely other instances in which the party receives benefits at the expense of others.
Over the long run, such benefits and burdens tend to even out.2 49
practical matter, the enhanced value of property through exactions imposed by government in
its coordinating function far exceeds the cost of the exaction.
245 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18 (1992);
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). For
general discussions of the Supreme Court's treatment of reciprocity in takings analysis, see
Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity ofAdvantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory
of Talngs Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 297 (1990); Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the
"Harm/Benefit" and "Average Reciprocity of Advantage" Rules in Comprehensive Takings
Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1449 (1997).
24 6 See Cordes, supra note 13, at 236.
24 7 See id. at 236-37.
248 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415); Penn
Central, 439 U.S. at 124.
249 Professor Frank Michelman makes this point in his seminal article on takings,
Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation
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The perceived unfairness of agricultural zoning in part results from a lack of
specific reciprocity in such restrictions. Although the degree of specific
reciprocity for affected landowners depends on a number of variables, it is fair to
assume that in many instances any reciprocal benefits from agricultural zoning
are quite limited. As noted earlier, most of the benefits from agricultural zoning
go to neighbors and broader society. Although the regulated landowner shares in
such benefits, that person's share will likely be quite small when compared to the
potential financial loss, especially if nearby property is permitted to develop. This
results in a perception that the benefits and burdens of regulation are unevenly
distributed, which understandably touches on issues of fairness.
From the broader perspective of general reciprocity, however, there is little
doubt that affected owners of regulated farmland receive substantial reciprocal
benefits from regulatory life in general. As discussed in the previous subsection,
this might involve givings in terms of farm subsidies and infrastructure
development as well as the substantial benefits from land use controls on
surrounding property. Farm property also benefits from various environmental
protections on surrounding land, such as wetlands and floodplain controls. On a
broader level, as members of society, owners of farmland benefit from numerous
economic and social regulations designed to facilitate commerce and protect
citizens from the harmful consequences of economic activity.
Any serious fairness argument must recognize the significant regulatory
benefits that flow to landowners from other regulations. To focus only on the
burden from a particular regulation distorts the regulatory equation, making
government accountable for the burdens imposed, but not for the benefits created.
For all practical purposes, this would make almost all government regulatory
efforts vulnerable to charges of unfairness, because when viewed in isolation
most regulations will burden some parties more than others.
The more proper perspective, as suggested by the Supreme Court, is to
recognize that the burdens imposed from any particular regulation are simply part
of "adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life."250 From this perspective
any perceived distributive unfairness from agricultural zoning is necessarily
mitigated by the regulatory benefits bestowed on such landowners in other ways.
Law", 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967):
Efficiency-motivated collective measures will regularly inflict on countless people
disproportionate burdens which cannot practically be erased by compensation settlements.
In the face of this difficulty, it seems we are pleased to believe that we can arrive at an
acceptable level of assurance that over time the burdens associated with collectively
determined improvements will have been distributed "evenly" enough so that everyone
will be a net gainer.
Id. at 1225.
250 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415); Penn
Central, 439 U.S. at 124.
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This is not meant to suggest that the balance of burdens and benefits always evens
out in the long haul, which might not always be the case.251 It does mean,
however, that our understanding of fairness must be based on a broad perspective,
tempering any perceived unfairness based on burdens from a land use restriction
viewed in isolation.
C. Property Rights and Landowner Expectations
A third general response to the fairness argument concerns the nature of
property rights and landowner expectations. The argument that agricultural
zoning is unfair, because it forces a few landowners to suffer loss for the benefit
of broader society, is in part predicated on the idea that private property
ownership includes the right to use the property as the owner chooses. Thus,
agricultural zoning and similar restrictions are viewed as forcing landowners to
forego opportunities that are interwoven in their rights as property owners to
benefit society. The forced loss of what are seen as normal property rights without
compensation exacerbate fairness concerns.
However, as a number of legal commentators have noted, such a perspective
is neither the traditional nor the proper way to view property rights.2 52 Rather, our
legal system has long recognized that private property interests are subject to
broader public uses.253 This has been referred to at times as the social fimction254
or social obligation of property, indicating that property ownership must be seen
in a broader social setting with responsibilities as well as rights. Thus, restricting
property to agricultural use does not necessarily involve the deprivation of
property rights, but rather asserting a limitation inherent in the property use itself.
This social dimension to private property is most clearly seen in nuisance
law, which requires that one not use property so as to cause an unreasonable harm
251 Agricultural Economist C. Ford Runge, however, has argued that the vast majority of
farmland and natural resource land is owned by large landowners, and such owners tend to be
net winners in the big picture from government activity. See Private Property Rights and
Environmental Laws: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Env't. & Pub. Works, 104th
Cong. 163, 163-65 (1995).
252 See generally Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lockean
Soliloquy: A Role for Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095
(1996); Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights and the New
Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. &LEEL. REV. 265 (1996).
253 See, e.g., Leslie Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics?, 34 BUiFF. L.
REv. 735, 751-52 (1985) (discussing restrictions on perceived noxious activity in early
America); Duncan, supra note 252 at 1133-37 (discussing types of restrictions on property use
found in early America); Rose, supra note 252 at 274-82 (same); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1055-60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing types of land use restrictions in colonial period).
254 See Gerald Torres, Takings and Givings: Police Power, Public Value, and Private
Right, 26 ENVTL. L. 1, 5 (1996).
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to others z55 Beyond that, however, courts have long held that use of private
property is subject to the common good and public rights. For example, as long
ago as 1846 the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in upholding a prohibition on
owners removing sand or stone from private beaches, stated that "[a]ll property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used to injure the
equal rights of others, or to destroy or greatly impair the pubic rights and interests
of the community.... "256 The widespread growth and acceptance of landuse
restrictions in the early part of this century similarly reflects judicial recognition
that property interests are limited by social needs. Indeed, the Supreme Court
itself recognized this principle in a number of decisions during this period,
frequently stating that property ownership is limited by public needs z57
This longstanding recognition that private property is subject to public
interests flows from the fact that property is a social construct 258 and society can
legitimately define the extent of private property interests to be limited by social
concerns. Construing property interests in this manner recognizes that the
consequences of property use inevitably extend beyond land boundaries and will
often conflict with other social needs, necessitating a reasonable acc6mmodation
of interests. This includes not only the avoidance of nuisance-like behavior, but
also protection of sensitive lands, including prime farmland, as an environmental
and social resource2 59 Although the need to encourage investment in property
255 The prohibition on creating a nuisance to surrounding property owners has long been
recognized in English and American property law. What constitutes a nuisance, and how the
balance is drawn between competing property uses, has evolved over time, reflecting changing
societal values. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43
UCLA L. REV. 77, 100-01 (discussing evolution of nuisance law in Anglo/American property
law and noting how it illustrates the "inherent ambiguity of absolute ownership?).
2 56 Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55, 57 (1846). For a discussion of
Tewksbury and other early cases that clearly show that private property was subject to public
rights, see Duncan, supra note 252.
2 57 See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (holding that private property
interests must at times "yield to the good of the community" for the sake of "progress");
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (stating that private property
limited by other public interests, including exercise of the police power "to protect the
atmosphere, the water and the forests"); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) ("all
property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not
be injurious to the community").
2 58 Scholars and legal commentators have often noted that property is a social creation of
the state. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumnm, The End ofEnvironmental Law? Libertarian Property,
Natural Law, and the Just Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25 ENVTL. L. 171, 182
(1995); Daniel W. Bromley, Regulatory Takings: Coherent Concept or Logical Contradiction?,
17 VT. L. REV. 647,653-55 (1993); Coletta, supra note 245, at 361-63.
259 Recent years have seen a growing understanding of the critical environmental role
played by certain lands, such as wetlands and coastal zones, and their interconnectedness with
the rest of nature. A growing body of legal scholarship is noting how understandings of private
property must adapt to this changing understanding of ecology. This includes recognition that
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requires protection of private interests in many instances, it is reasonable to view
those private interests as ending when they interfere with broader social
interests.260
It is important to emphasize that this accommodation between private and
public interests is an inherent limitation in the nature of private property to begin
with, rather than a deprivation of interests. Thus, fairness arguments predicated on
the deprivation of private interests for the public good are misplaced. To the
extent that agricultural zoning is designed to protect the public interest in a
valuable resource, it is simply asserting a limitation inherent in the property
ownership to begin with. Certainly, sensitivity to the impact on private parties is
called for in such situations, but in discussing fairness it should not be viewed as
taking an established right from regulated landowners. The assertion of inherent
limitations is both reasonable and arguably fair.
For similar reasons, agricultural zoning is not necessarily an unreasonable
interference with landowner expectations. As discussed in Part III.A with regard
to takings, the fairness of agricultural zoning relative to landowner expectations is
most clearly seen with regard to instances where property was purchased with
agricultural restrictions in place and the landowner is unsuccessfully seeking a
more intensive rezoning of the property. Although refusal to rezone in such a
situation might result in significant loss of potential profit, maintaining current
restrictions designed to preserve public values can hardly be viewed as unfair.
Even where the purchase price reflects the potential for intensive development,
this is speculation on possible change and hardly deserving of compensation.261
such sensitive lands are affected with a public interest that necessarily must limit development.
See, e.g., Freyfogle, supra note 255, at 109-14, 135-38; Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the
Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 1433, 1442-49 (1993). Prime farmland clearly fits within this idea of valuable
environmental and social resource land. Not only does it confer environmental benefits not
unlike other sensitive lands, but is the source of our current and future food production.
260 See, e.g., Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (stating that private
property interests must at times "yield to the good of the community"); Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623, 665 (1887) ("all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the
owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community"); Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush.
53, 84-85 (Mass. 1851) ("every holder of property... holds it under" limitation that it not be
injurious to others and held subject to "those general regulations, which are necessary to the
common good and general welfare").
261 Courts have frequently commented that there is nothing unfair nor any interference
with reasonable expectations when landowners buy property with restrictions in place and have
requests for zoning changes denied, as long as the property remains profitable as originally
zoned. See, e.g., Habersham at Northridge v. Fulton County, 632 F. Supp. 815, 823 (N.D. Ga.
1985); Gilliland v. City of Palmdale, 179 Cal. Rptr. 627,632-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); County
of Ida v. Henry, 668 P.2d 994, 997 (Idaho 1983); Harvard State Bank v. County of McHenry,
620 N.E.2d 1360, 1363-64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Racich v. County of Boone, 625 N.E.2d 1095,
1099 (11. App. Ct. 1993); Woolston v. Monticello Orderly Annexation Area Bd. No. CO-90-
1398, 1990 WL 204290 (Minn. App. Dec. 18, 1990); Chokecherry Hills Estates, Inc. v. Deuel
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The fairness concern over expectations is admittedly stronger, however,
when property is downzoned, reflecting substantial diminution in value. Even if
such a loss does not constitute a taking for the reasons discussed in Part III, there
is still arguably an element of unfairness in creating a significant loss for the
benefit of others. This is, of course, exacerbated if the loss is concentrated on only
a few landowners, with the benefits from regulation going to a more diffuse
public.
Even here, however, legitimate fairness issues are tempered when seen in a
broader context. First, the previous discussion on givings and reciprocity is
relevant in that some of the lost value has often been created by government, and
losses that remain must be seen in the broader regulatory context. More
significantly, the idea of regulatory risk also tempers fairness concerns in such
situations. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has developed this theme in
several cases, stating that the risk of regulation is part of economic life, which
includes the possibility of economic loss. 262 In Lucas, the Court specifically
applied this idea to land use regulation, stating that "[i]t seems to us that the
property owner necessarily expects the use of his property to be restricted, from
time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the state in legitimate
exercise of its police powers."263 Thus, since reasonable expectations necessarily
incorporate the possibility of land use restrictions, expectations are not unfairly
interfered with when such restrictions are imposed.2 64
The validity of this regulatory risk argument in part turns on the foreseeability
of regulation. For example, discovery of an endangered species on property that
greatly limits the property's use and consequently reduces its value is largely
unexpected. Even though at one level such risk can be taken account of, as a
practical matter it is typically unanticipated and concentrated on a few owners,
and thus arguably raising fairness concerns justifying compensation.2 65 In
contrast, restrictions on land use are more readily anticipated in our society,266
including agricultural restrictions on existing farmland on the urban fringe. This is
particularly true where restrictions are pursuant to careful planning, identifying
land most suitable for continued agricultural use in terms of soil type and location.
County, 294 N.W.2d 654,656 (S.D. 1980).
2 62 See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,227 (1986) ("those who
do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by
subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end") (quoting Federal Housing Authority v.
The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84,91 (1958)).
263 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
264 See, e.g., Humbach, supra note 135, at 367-68; Mandelker, supra note 147, at 233-36;
Michelman, supra note 145, at 415.
265 See Barton H. Thompson, The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and
Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 360-61 (1997) (stating that the discovery of endangered
species on land "akin to Act of God.").
2 66 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027; Humbach, supra note 135, at 367-68.
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In such situations any reasonable landowner expectations must necessarily
recognize that prime farmland is subject to possible restriction. As such,
downzoning of land to agricultural use, which eliminates previous development
opportunities, must fall within the reasonable expectations of landowners and not
be seen as unfair.
That such downzoning does not violate fairness concerns is further reflected
in the fact that the value of undeveloped property, when zoned for development
should be discounted to reflect the possibility of greater restrictions at a later
time.2 67 Thus, the purchaser or holder of such property gets the property at a
reduced value to reflect the risk of possible regulation. In this manner, investment
in undeveloped land inevitably involves a degree of speculation in which the
owner of such land receives a degree of windfall when subsequent restrictions are
not imposed, and a degree of loss when they are.2 68 Losses under such
circumstances can hardly be viewed as unfair, especially when the possibility of
such regulatory losses can be reasonably anticipated and when in many other
circumstances windfalls are received.
V. CONCLUSION
The last several decades have seen a growing concern over farmland
preservation, most clearly reflected in the variety of state and local efforts to
address conversion concerns. Although each of these programs has a legitimate
role to play in preserving farmland, any serious effort at preservation must
ultimately take the power to convert from landowners. Otherwise, no matter how
many incentives and protections are afforded landowners, they will eventually
succumb to economic pressures to sell. For this reason, agricultural zoning has
become a necessary and central component of most efforts to protect farmland.
However, agricultural zoning is controversial, largely because of the
significant impact it often imposes on landowners under the greatest conversion
pressure. In particular, it is commonly subject to two closely related concerns: that
the substantial diminution in value constitutes an unconstitutional taking and,
even if constitutional, the substantial economic burdens imposed are unfair.
This Article has shown that if done pursuant to sound planning, agricultural
zoning should not normally constitute a taking or be viewed as inherently unfair,
despite substantial economic impacts on owners. Most agricultural zoning should
not be a taking under Supreme Court takings jurisprudence, which focuses on
whether property remains economically viable and the degree of interference with
investment-backed expectations. This has been borne out by lower court
decisions, which have typically rejected takings challenges to agricultural zoning.
Where land is not suitable for agricultural use, however, courts have appropriately
267 See Mandelker, supra note 147, at 235-36.
268 See id at 235-36.
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found a taking to exist.
Similarly, agricultural zoning is not inherently unfair even when substantial
economic impact exists. Although it might lack the specific reciprocity often seen
with other land-use regulations, regulatory impacts must be seen from a broader
perspective in which much of the property values were created by government
"givings" and in which landowners benefit from other regulatory measures.
Moreover, our legal system has long recognized that property ownership is
subject to the broader public interest, and reasonable landowner expectations
must incorporate the possibility of regulation to further such interests.
Recognition that agricultural zoning is neither a taking nor inherently unfair
is not meant to preclude consideration of the compensatory alternatives of PDR
and TDR programs, which also deprive the landowner of decisionmaking
authority. Although not the focus of this Article, when feasible to implement,
such compensatory approaches arguably have two advantages over
uncompensated zoning. First, they might give more permanence to the restrictions
than zoning, which tends to grant changes with ease, especially when subject to
political or developmental pressure. For this reason, zoning is often viewed as an
unstable control mechanism, especially when applied to undeveloped land subject
to substantial development pressure.2 69 In contrast, restrictions pursuant to PDR
and TDR programs are more insulated to change pressure, in part because
compensation has been provided to the affected landowner.
Second, the PDR and TDR compensatory approaches might at times be a
more equitable distribution of the burdens and benefits of preservation. Although,
as noted earlier, fairness must be viewed from broad as well as narrow
perspectives, PDR and TDR programs arguably more closely align the burdens
with the benefits of farmland preservation. Rather than placing the entire burden
of regulation on the affected landowner, with the benefits flowing to the public in
general, the compensatory approaches spread the cost of regulation to the broader
public. With PDRs this is done through increased taxes or other means of revenue
raising, such as impact fees, with the cost thus being imposed on local citizens
generally or some identifiable segment. The cost shifting of TDR programs is
more subtle, with the burden of preservation falling in several possible places,
including developers who purchase the TDRs or neighbors in the "receiving"
area.27° Under both the PDR and TDR approaches, however, the cost of
269 See MALONE, supra note 27 at § 6.08(1); Coughlin & Keene, supra note 67 at 9;
Michael T. Peddle, The Effects of Growth Management Policies on Agricultural Land Values,
at 48 in COMPETrmON FOR THE LAND 27, 48 (1997); White, supra note 7 at 117-18; see also
Church, supra note 5, at 554 (describing political problems of enforcing zoning restrictions on
farmland).
270 Assuming the restricted landowner sells the TDRs to a developer in a designated
"receiving area!' who uses them to exceed otherwise applicable limitations, the out of pocket
expense falls on the developer. However, the developer is receiving benefits in the form of
more intensive development, and therefore the true cost arguably falls on surrounding
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preservation is distributed across a broader spectrum of society, which, if not
necessarily required by notions of fairness, is nonetheless desirable if it can be
achieved.
These modest equity concerns, together with the greater permanence afforded
by PDR and TDR programs, suggest that they should be encouraged and pursued
when feasible. Indeed, though experience remains limited, there are indications
that both types of programs are seeing a slight increase in use. A number of local
governments have established PDR or conservation easement programs in recent
years.271 These have received further impetus by provisions of the 1996 Farm
Bill, which provided for some matching federal funds for state and local PDR
programs. 272 Several successful TDR programs have also been developed
specifically for farmland preservation. 273 Perhaps the best known is that in
Montgomery County, Maryland, where a successful TDR program designed to
preserve farmland has been in place for several years274 and to date has preserved
over 38,000 acres of farmland.275
Despite these successes, and despite the advantages of such programs, at the
present time both PDR and TDR programs are realistically limited in their
potential reach. The obvious problem with PDRs is their cost, which makes them
unrealistic for widespread use as a preservation technique, especially in times of
neighbors who are subject to more intense development than would normally be the cost. If,
however, the "receiving area" had been manipulated to be more restrictive than normal to make
the TDRs more attractive, then arguably the cost falls on the developer who is paying for
development opportunities that would normally have been free absent the TDR program. Cf
Church, supra note 5, at 552 n.129 (suggesting problem of manipulating restrictions in
"receiving areas" to detriment of property owners in such areas); Fehr, supra note 11 (noting
that some residents in receiving areas under Montgomery County TDR plan are unhappy about
increased density). The developer would likely pass on at least part of that cost to prospective
consumers of the development In either situation, the cost of preservation is shifted from the
restricted owner of farmland to some segment of the public.
271 See White, supra note 7, at 140-43 (discussing successful conservation easement
program in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania).
272 See Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127,
110 Stat. 888 (1996).
273 See TOM DANIELS & DEBORAH BOWERS, HOLDING OUR GROUND 179-86 (1996)
(describing six different TDR programs designed to preserve farmland).
274 See Fehr, supra note 11 (discussing Montgomery County's TDR program); Sarah J.
Stevenson, Note, Banking on TDRs: The Government's Role as Banker of Transferable
Development Rights, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1329, 1355-58 (1998) (describing Montgomery
County's TDR program).
275 See American Farmland Trust, Transfer of Development Rights: Fact Sheet Oast
modified Sept. 1998) <http'//FarmFic.niu.edu/fic-ta/tafs-tdr.html>. The New Jersey Pinelands
Reserve also has a TDR component to its Management Plan, which as of 1995 had resulted in
nearly 13,000 acres of farmland protected through use of TDRs. See White, supra note 7, at 139
(describing operation of the New Jersey Pinelands Reserve TDR/Farmland program).
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fiscal restraint.276 TDR programs avoid this problem by providing development
rights instead of money, but are contingent on the right mix of ingredients to
succeed, including appropriate "receiving areas" that are restrictive enough to
make the TDRs valuable and which can easily absorb increased development.2 77
Moreover, successful programs require stability of zoning restrictions so that the
value of TDRs are not undermined.2 78 Thus, the problem of frequent and easy
change that threatens the efficiency of zoning as a preservation technique
similarly undermines the feasibility of TDR programs.
For these reasons, PDR and TDR programs will play only a limited role in
farmland preservation in the immediate future,27 9 with agricultural zoning
necessarily playing a central role in most preservation efforts. Despite the
potential problem of instability, zoning provides a realistic preservation
mechanism for local governments truly committed to that goal. If done pursuant
to sound planning, such zoning should not pose constitutional concerns nor be
inherently unfair to those affected.
276 The fiscal restraints of PDR programs have been noted by numerous commentators.
See, e.g., MALONE, supra note 27, § 6.11(2); REDFIELD, supra note 5, at 99-100; Church, supra
note 5, at 545-46; Teri E. Popp, A Survey of Agricultural Zoning: State Responses to the
Farmland Crisis, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUsT J. 371, 378-79 (1998); White, supra note 7,
at 141.
277 See, e.g., DANIEL & BOWERS, supra note 273, at 187-90 (discussing various barriers to
successful TDR programs); Kayden, supra note 90, at 574-79.
278 See, e.g., Kayden, supra note 90, at 578.
279 The actual amount of farmland preserved under PDR and TDR programs, though
growing, is still quite limited. The website for the Center for Agriculture and the Environment
(CAE) has a table documenting local governments with TDR programs as of 1997 and the
amount of farmland actually preserved through such programs. Although several local
governmental bodies, such as Montgomery County, Maryland, have protected significant
amounts of land, the total is less than 70,000 acres, more than half of which comes from
Montgomery County alone. See American Farmland Trust, Transfer of Development Rights:
Fact Sheet (last modified Sept. 1998) <http'/Farm.Fic.niu.edu/fic-ta/tafs-tdr.html>. PDR
programs have shown greater success, with the CAE listing 406,725 acres of farmland that have
been preserved through PDR programs. See id.
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